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I. INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property law serves a variety of societal goals, including 
fostering innovation and promoting economic and cultural development. 
While vital, however, intellectual property law alone cannot optimally achieve 
these widely shared goals. An important issue deserving scholarly attention 
concerns the proper role of the federal tax system in achieving intellectual 
property law's innovation objectives. Most tax theorists would argue that an 
ideal tax system should seek to minimize the social costs of taxation and avoid 
unnecessarily shaping economic behavior. But it might be decided that the tax 
system should depart from these tax principles to further innovation. Of 
course, tax rules that deliberately attempt to reward creative process and 
further innovation must provide certainty, clarity, and dependability necessary 
for compliance with, and sound administration of, the law. To do that, the 
rules must necessarily recognize changes in innovation and reflect the realities 
oftoday's economy. 
The Income Tax of 1913, which was adopted shortly after the ratification of 
the Sixteenth Amendment, encompassed only fourteen pages of statutes. 1 It 
did not specifically address intellectual property and scant administrative 
1. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 116-80. The first income tax was not enacted 
untill862. Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 (repealed 1872); see also U.S. DEP'T OF 
TilE TREASURY, Fact Sheet on the History of the US Tax System, 
http://www.ustreas.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/ ustax.shtml O.ast visited October 22, 2010). 
The income tax was reinstated in 1894. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 570. But, it was 
shortly thereafter declared unconstitutional as a direct tax not apportioned among the states. 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loar1 & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). This led to the adoption ofthe 
Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, which allows Congress to levy a direct tax without 
apportionment. U.S. CoNST. amend. XVI. See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. 
SCHENK, fEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 6-7 (6th ed. 2009); I. 
RICHARD GERSHON & JEFFREY A. MAINE, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO TilE INTERNAL REVENUE 
CODE 1-2 (5th ed. 2007). 
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guidance existed on the application of traditional tax principles to intellectual 
property transactions. This was of no particular consequence at a time when 
tangible, physical property was the driving engine of commerce. 
As intellectual property's role in the world economy increased so, too, did 
the controversies between taxpayers and the government over the tax 
implications of intellectual property transactions (e.g., development, 
acquisitions, sales, and licenses). Equipped only with general tax rules, which 
had theretofore been applied only to tangible assets, courts were increasingly 
faced with important, new questions. For example, should research and 
development costs be currently deductible under general tax principles even 
though the research may not result in the development of a patent or other 
identifiable asset? Should a copyright assignment be treated as a "sale" under 
general tax principles, even though payment is in the form of royalties? 
Should litigation costs in patent infringement suits be treated the same for tax 
purposes as litigation costs in trademark infringement suits? There was 
considerable diversity of opinion among the courts dealing with these and 
other significant tax issues involving intellectual property. Sound federal tax 
legislation was necessary to improve the clarity and consistency of tax results. 
Congress did not begin enacting specific intellectual property tax rules until 
the mid-twentieth century, even though intellectual property laws relating to 
protection and enforcement had been developing since the inception of the 
nation. As a result of tax legislation over the past six decades, the Internal 
Revenue Code (the Code) contains several specific rules governing major 
transactions involving various forms of intellectual property. Some of the 
present rules are exclusive, governing specific forms of intellectual property; 
others are equally applicable to all forms of intellectual property. While some 
of the rules were designed to support intellectual property goals (i.e., to 
incentivize desirable intellectual property activity and promote economic 
growth), the vast majority of the specific tax rules were enacted on an ad hoc 
basis with particular tax goals in mind. This Article traces the historic 
development of the specific tax rules governing intellectual property, identifies 
present areas of policy dissonance in the intersection of intellectual property 
and taxation, and calls for an appropriate legal framework for future 
intellectual property tax legislation. 
Part II of the Article describes how early courts struggled to understand the 
unique attributes of intellectual property and their relevance under general tax 
principles in resolving intellectual property disputes. Because some of the 
earliest disputes involved the taxation of patent transactions, Part II provides 
several examples of early tax uncertainties in the life cycle of a patent. 
Part III identifies underlying causes of early procedural dissonance between 
intellectual property and taxation that resulted when traditional principles of 
taxation applicable to tangible property were applied to intellectual property 
transactions. Specifically, Part III argues that this procedural dissonance 
resulted primarily from three sources: (1) difficulty identifying when intangible 
intellectual property rights constituted separable property for tax purposes 
when competing concepts of property could yield differing tax results; (2) 
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difficulty reconciling the substantive similarities and differences among the 
forms of intellectual property in determining proper tax results and developing 
frameworks for future guidance; and (3) difficulty establishing, for tax 
purposes, the relevance of tangible media embodying intellectual property vis­
a-vis the intangible legal attributes of intellectual property. Part III highlights 
the need for a rational set of special tax rules to resolve uncertainties and 
difficulties that arose upon the early intersection of intellectual property and 
taxation. 
Part IV of the Article examines legislative responses to early dissonance 
between the intellectual property regime and historic tax principles. In 
analyzing intellectual property tax rules, it is helpful to understand as much as 
possible about why they exist and how they fit into or conflict with the 
intellectual property scheme. To that end, Part IV analyzes tax rules specific to 
intellectual property in terms of their legislative purpose and seeks to identifY 
common goals behind special intellectual property tax rules. Part V observes 
that, although a few tax provisions were designed to achieve important 
intellectual property goals, the vast majority were designed with specific tax 
goals in mind: to remove tax inequities or to enhance administrative efficiency. 
The addition of specific tax rules governing intellectual property achieved 
necessary procedural harmonization between the intellectual property and 
taxation schemes. Part V, however, shows that the resulting tax regime may 
not be adequately relevant in reflecting the evolution of technology and the 
reality of today's economy, such as the current integration and bundling of 
different types of intellectual property in practice. These, and perhaps other, 
areas of existing dissonance in the intersection of intellectual property and 
taxation need to be addressed if the tax system is to foster the intellectual 
property system's innovation objectives. 2 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: APPLYING NORMATIVE TAX 

PRINCIPLES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 

The term "intellectual property" was first mentioned in Davoli v. Brown, a 
Massachusetts case decided in 1845. 3 The term "intellectual property" 
2. This Article traces the development of specific tax rules governing intellectual property 
and notes the need for harmonization between the intellectual property and taxation schemes. For 
a critique ofthe broader intellectual property tax regime (which includes a combination ofspecial 
and general tax rules) using normative criteria in evaluating taxes (equity and efficiency) and for 
a proposed legal framework for future tax legislation, see Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. 
Maine, Equity andEfficiency in Intellectual Property Taxation, 76 BRooK. L. REv. 1 (2010). 
3. Davoli v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) ("A liberal construction is to 
be given to a patent, and inventors sustained, if practicable, without a departure from sound 
principles. Only thus can ingenuity and perseverance be encouraged to exert themselves in this 
way usefully to the community; and only in this way can we protect intellectual property, the 
labors of the mind, productions and interests as much a man's own, and as much the fruit of his 
honest industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks he rears."); see also Peter S. Merrell, 
Intellectual Property am the Property Rights Movement, REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 37, 
available at http ://www.cato.org/pubs!regulation/regv30n3/v30n3-6.pdf (citing Davoll v. Brown 
as the first reported legal decision using the term "intellectual property"). 
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generally refers to patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. 4 Though 
the term "intellectual property" came into existence in the nineteenth century, 
different types of intellectual property have been in existence for a much 
longer time. 5 Some have been around for several hundred years 6 and others 
for several thousand years. 7 
Early federal income tax laws did not deal specifically with intellectual 
property assets even though protections for these rights had long existed. 8 At 
the beginning of our nation, Congress had the enumerated power to lay and 
collect tax. 9 Early on Congress levied numerous tariffs on items such as 
distilled SJ?irits, tobacco and snuff, auction sales, and various legal 
documents. 10 The first income tax, however, was not enacted until 1862, to 
4. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009). 
5. See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Making Much Ado About Theory: The Chinese 
Trademark Law, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 53, 70-71 (2008) (explaining the 
historical fonndation of Chinese trademarks in antiquity); Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Holding 
Intellectual Property, 39 GA. L. REv. 1155, 1159 n.lO (2005) (noting the development of 
trademarks as source identifiers). 
6. See generally BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT 
LAw 43-44 (1967) (stating that nnder the Venetian Patent Statute, the Venetian government 
granted a privilegi to Marc' Antonio Sabellico on September 1, 1486, for his work of authorship, 
Decades rerum Cenetarum); Francis J. Swayze, The Growing Law, 25 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1915) 
(observing the growing body oflaw relating to copyrights in the eighteenth century). 
7. See Milton E. Babirak, Jr., The Maryland Unifonn Trade Secrets Act: A Critical 
Summary ofthe Act and Case Law, 31 U. BALT. L. REv. 181, 183 (2002) (noting the history of 
trademark law in ancient Rome and Greece); Ke Shao, Look at My Sign!-Trademarks in China 
from Antiquity to the Early Modem Times, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 654, 654 
(2005) (tracing the history oftrademark usage in China for several thousand years); Alan Watson, 
Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The Myth Exploded, 11 TuL. EuR. & Crv. L.F. 19, 19 (1996) 
(disputing the accuracy ofassertions relating to Roman trade secrets law). 
8. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text. 
9. See U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, ... but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be nniform 
throughout the United States."); Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax 
Legislation: A Series of Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51, 79-81 (2006) (analyzing 
Congress's taxing power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and the requirement for 
nniform federal tax law throughout the United States). See generally Yoseph Edrey, 
Constitutional Review and Tax Law: An Analytical Framework, 56 AM. U . L. REv. 1187, 1191 
(2007) (explaining that the power of Congress in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to levy 
taxes is broad); Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source ofthe 
Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REv. 801, 835-37 (2007) 
(discussing Congress's power to tax and the Framers' original intent). 
Interestingly, the same Section of Article I also vests in Congress the power to grant 
copyright and patent rights to authors and inventors. See, e.g., Irah Donner, The Copyright 
Clause ofthe US. Constitution: Why Did the Framers Include it with Unanimous Approval?, 36 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 361 (1992); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the 
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119, 1143-60; Rebecca C.E. McFadyen, The "First-to-File " Patent 
System: Why Adoption is Not an Option!, 14 Ric H. J.L. & TECH. 3, 17-23 (2007) (tracing the 
roots of the Patent and Copyright Clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution); Edward C. 
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress ofScience and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin 
ofthe Intellec tual Property Clause ofthe United States Constitution, 2 1. INTELL. PRoP. L. 1, 10 
(1994). 
10. For a briefhistory of taxation in the United States, see GRAETZ & ScHENK, supra note 1, 
at 4-12. The Department of Treasury's website also provides a brief history of the U.S. tax 
system: 
To pay the debts of the Revolutionary War, Congress levied excise taxes on 
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help finance the Civil War, and it was re~ealed after the war in 1872 due to the 
1decline in the need for federal revenue. The income tax was reinstated in 
1894 but was declared unconstitutional shortly thereafter as a direct tax not 
apportioned among the states. 12 This led to the adoption of the Sixteenth 
Amendment in 1913, which allows Congress to levy a direct tax without 
apportionment. 13 The Income Tax of 1913 was adopted shortly after the 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. 14 
These early income tax laws were void of tax rules specific to intellectual 
15 property. This was of no particular consequence at a time when tangible, 
physical property was the driving engine of modern commerce. As intellectual 
property became the dominant source of wealth in the world, however, the tax 
implications of intellectual property transactions became more important. 
Courts were called upon to resolve numerous controversies between taxpay ers 
and the government over the tax consequences of intellectual property 
development, acquisitions, and dispositions. Because the existing tax regime 
did not specifically address these matters, courts were forced to rely upon 
general tax principles in resolving tax disputes. Outcomes were diverse as 
courts struggled to understand the unique, intangible characteristics of 
intellectual property and to determine their relevance under general tax rules 
applicable to tangible property. 
Some of the earliest tax debates involved patent transactions. To frame 
some of the issues with which courts struggled, the following example is 
provided. It highlights tax uncertainties in the life cycle of a patent­
development, acquisition, and disposition. As is demonstrated, the intangible 
nature of patent rights challenged many early notions of tax law. 
distilled spirits, tobacco and snuff, refined sugar, carriages, property sold at 

auctions, and various legal documents. 

During the confrontation with France in the late 1790's, the Federal 

Government imposed the first direct taxes on the owners of houses, land, 

slaves, and estates. When the Civil War erupted, the Congress passed 

the Revenue Act of 1861, which restored earlier excises taxes and imposed a 

tax on personal incomes. 

On July 1, 1862 the Congress passed new excise taxes on such items as 

playing cards, gunpowder, feathers , telegrams, iron, leather, pianos, yachts, 

billiard tables, drugs, patent medicines, and whiskey. Many legal 

documents were also taxed and license fees were collected for almost all 

professions and trades. . . . The need for Federal revenue declined sharply 

after the war and most taxes were repealed. By 1868, the main somce of 

Government revenue derived from liquor and tobacco taxes. The income tax 

was abolished in 1872. From 1868 to 1913, almost 90 percent ofall revenue 

was collected from the remaining excises. 

U.S. DEP'T OF TilE TREASURY, supra note 1. 
11. Id. 
12. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever somce derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration."). 
14. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-80. 
15. There has been a tremendous amount of tax legislation since 1913. It was not unti11950, 
however, that Congress enacted a tax provision specific to intellectual property. See infra Part V. 
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A. APPLYING GENERAL ASSET CAPITALIZATION TO RESEARCH COSTS 
Since inception of the modem federal income tax, the Code has permitted a 
current deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses. 16 The Code 
has precluded, however, a current deduction for so-called "capital 
expenditures," historically viewed as any expenditure that produces an asset 
lasting beyond the current tax period. 17 Applying the asset capitalization rule 
to tangible property presents few problems. If a business spends money to 
construct a widget-making machine, a classic capital asset (i.e., a separate and 
distinct asset lasting beyond the construction year), the construction costs are 
18
not currently deductible. In contrast, applying the asset capitalization rule to 
research and development costs can be challenging for a number of reasons. It 
is often difficult to determine when research activities result in an identifiable 
asset, the costs of which must be capitalized. Further, because research may 
span several years with varying degrees of success, it is often difficult to 
apportion costs if a particular project partly succeeds and partly fails or when 
different and simultaneous research activities contribute in varying degrees to 
19
the development of an asset or assets. 
Perhaps it was for these reasons that the Treasury adopted a liberal approach 
in its initial treatment of research costs. In 1919, it promulgated a regulation 
that gave taxpayers the option of either deducting or capitalizing expenses "for 
designs, drawings, patterns, models, or work of an experimental nature [if] 
calculated to result in improvement[s] of [taxpayers'] facilities or [taxpayers'] 
product[ s]. " 20 Shortly thereafter, however, the Treasury deleted the 
21
regulation because it found that certain taxpayers were enjoying double tax 
16. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 ("(I]n computing net income for 
the purpose ofthe normal tax there shall be allowed as deductions: First, the necessary expenses 
actually paid in carrying on any business ...."). For the current business expense allowance 
provision, see I.R.C. § 162 (2010). 
17. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (providing "(t]hat no deduction 
shall be allowed for any amount paid out for new buildings, permanent improvements, or 
betterments, made to increase the value of any property'). For the current disallowance 
provisions, see I.R.C. §§ 263, 263A (2010). The reason capital expenditures are not currently 
deductible is that the property created or acquired is not consumed or used up within the year but 
rather continues to contribute to income over a period of years. If the costs incurred in the 
creation or acquisition of such property were deductible in full in the current year, there would be 
a mismatching of income and expenses that produced that income; income would be understated 
in the year of creation or acquisition and overstated in later years. By prohibiting the immediate 
deduction of capital expenditures, this problem is avoided. 
18. See I.R.C. §§ 263(a), 263A(a) (2010); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2, 73 Fed. Reg. 
12838, 12852-56 (Mar. 10, 2008) (providing rules for applying section 263 to amounts paid to 
produce tangible property). 
19. See DavidS. Hudson, The Tax Concept ofResearch or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAW. 
85, 88--89 (1991) (explaining why the asset-capitalization rule is difficult to apply to research and 
development costs); see also George Mundstock, Taxation ofBusiness Intangible Capital, 135 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1179, 1258- 59 (1987). 
20. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919) (Regulation 45 states: "A 
taxpayer who has incurred expenses in his business for designs, drawings, patterns, models, or 
work ofan experimental nature calculated to result in improvement ofhis facilities or his product, 
may at his option deduct such expenses from gross income for the taxable year in which they are 
incurred or treat such articles as a capital asset to the extent ofthe amount so expended."). 
21. Treas. Reg. 69, art. 168 (1926). 
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benefits from their research-i.e. , deducting research expenses when paid, but 
also capitalizin~ them in the basis of developed patents thereby reducing gain 
on later sales. 2 Even though the Treasury eliminated the deduction option, 
the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) continued to allow certain taxpayers 
to deduct research expenditures-namely those taxpayers who engaged in 
regular and continual research activities and who had established practices of 
accounting for research costs. 23 Courts did not necessarily find the Service's 
administrative policy binding. 24 Indeed, if the Service challenged the 
deduction of research costs incurred in the development of new processes, 
formulae, or patents, courts generally adhered to the asset-capitalization 
. . 1 25pnnc1p e. 
But without a framework for resolving tax disputes, courts struggled to 
apply the asset-capitalization rule to research costs. Should capitalization 
depend on the taxpayer's subjective intent or purpose of research activities, or 
should capitalization depend on the success of research activities? In other 
words, should capitalization be required if the taxpayer intends to improve an 
existing product or develop a new process or patent, or should capitalization be 
required only if the taxpayer develops a capital asset having a useful life 
beyond the year? Moreover, should a distinction be drawn between 
expenditures incurred for general scientific research and expenditures to 
develop patents on a particular process or formula? And when should 
capitalization apply to payments for technical assistance and know-how of 
services? There was lack of uniformity in addressing these and other 
. . 261mportant questwns. 
22. The Board of Tax Appeals (predecessor to the Tax Court), in at least two cases, 
sanctioned the double tax benefit. See Gilliam Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 1 B.T.A. 967, 970 (1925); 
Goodell-Pratt Co. v. Comm'r, 3 B.T.A. 30, 33-34 (1925). In these cases, the government argued 
capitalization was not appropriate since the taxpayer had elected earlier to deduct research costs. 
The court fonnd, however, that capitalization was proper since research costs resulted in creation 
of a patent. Gilliam Mfg. Co., 1 B.T.A. at 970; Goodell-Pratt Co., 3 B.T.A. at 32. For the early 
treatment of research expenses, see generally Donald C. Alexander, Research am Experimental 
Expenditures Umer the 1954 Code, 10 TAX L. REv. 549 (1955); James L. Musselman, Research 
and Experimental Expenditures-The Evolution of Deductibility Under the Trade or Business 
Requirement ofSection 174 ofthe Internal Revenue Code, 42 RuTGERS L. REv. 757 (1990). 
23. See Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co. v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 321, 341-42 (1955) (quoting 
statement by former Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Dunlap). 
24. !d. at 343. 
25. See, e.g. , Oaude Neon Lights, Inc. v. Corum 'r, 35 B.T.A. 424 (1937); Hazeltine Corp. v. 
Comm'r, 32 B.T.A. 110 (1935), affd, 89 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1937); Clem v. Comm'r, 10 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1248 (1951). 
26. In Strong, for example, the taxpayer spent sums to perfect a machine, but did not 
improve the machine or develop anything that was of subsequent use to him. Strong v. Corum 'r, 
14 B.T.A. 902, 903 (1928). The Board of Tax Appeals held that the research costs were 
deductible because the amounts did not result in the acquisition, development, or improvement of 
a capital asset having a useful life beyond the year; the taxpayer was engaged in purely 
experimental work in the development of this machine. Id at 903-04. On similar facts, a 
different court required capitalization of research costs. Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co. v. 
Corum'r, 182 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1950). In Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co., the taxpayer 
spent money to develop a new product from agricultural material using biological processes; 
however nothing of commercial value or of patentable nature was developed, so the biological 
research was dropped. Id at 154-55. The court held that the research expenditures were not 
currently deductible since they were calculated to result in improvement of its facilities or its 
109 
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Requiring capitalization of research expenditures seemed somewhat harsh, 
especially if research efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful. In such cases, tax 
law did permit an abandonment loss deduction for the year in which 
abandonment occurred. 27 But a loss deduction upon subsequent failure of 
research efforts was hardly viewed as an adequate economic incentive for 
28 
taxpayers to engage in desirable research activities. This highlights a 
fundamental problem with the general asset-capitalization rule: not only was it 
highly difficult to apply to research and development, but more significant£;, it 
also served to actually discourage important research and experimentation. 
B. APPLYING HISTORIC DEPRECIATION RULES TO PATENT ACQUISITION COSTS 
In an economic sense, depreciation is the decline in value of an asset due to 
wear and tear and obsolescence. 3° From the tax perspective, depreciation is a 
deduction from income, permitting the taxpayer to recover the capitalized cost 
of that asset. 31 Depreciation methods are sometimes called cost recovery 
32 
systems. So, for example, if an asset used in business for five years cost a 
taxpayer $20,000, the taxpayer might take a $4,000 deduction each year on her 
taxes for five years to reflect the decline in value of that asset and to reflect its 
contribution to the production of taxable income. The entire cost of the asset is 
not deducted all at once because the asset helped produce income over five 
years 33 To match the taxpayer's expenses against the revenues they helped 
produce, the taxpayer must spread out the deduction over the useful life of the 
asset. 34 This is, of course, a basic application of the principle discussed 
above-that the costs of assets must be capitalized. 
An early Treasury regulation adopted a seemingly simple rule for the 
products: "[W]e cannot conclude that it was not within the contemplation [of the taxpayer] that 
research ... might develop something ofa commercial and permanent value to petitioner." !d. at 
156. 
27. !d. at 157 (''Where there has been a complete abandonment of experiments and failure 
becomes an actual fact, a loss may be taken by way of deduction ... .");see Dresser Mfg. Co. v. 
Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 341, 345-46 (1939); Acme Prod Co. v. Comm'r, 24 B.T.A. 194, 196 (1931); 
see also Clem, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1248 (disallowing an abandonment deduction as taxpayer was 
still engaged in developing and perfecting his machine). 
28. Taxpayers will nearly always be economically advantaged by the acceleration of tax 
deductions. Current deductions reduce the taxpayer's current tax liability thereby leaving the 
taxpayer with the use ofhis or her money for longer. Because money makes money, the use of 
money has value. This is commonly referred to as ''the time value of money." See generally 
PAMELA PETERSON DRAKE & fRANK J. FABOZZl, FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF TilE 
T1ME VALUE OF MoNEY (2009). 
29. Internal Revenue Code of1954: Hearing on H.R. 8300 Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1954). 
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 506 (9th ed. 2009). 
31. JAMES J. fREELAND ET AL., FuNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 407 (5th 
ed. 2009). 
32. !d. at 408--{)9. 
33. See id. at 407-08. 
34. At the end of the asset's useful life, the acquisition costs will have been fully recovered, 
and the asset's basis will be zero, reflecting that all capitalized costs have been recovered fully. 
See I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (2010) (providing that the asset's basis is reduced each year as 
depreciation deductions are taken with respect to the asset). 
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depreciation of intangible assets. If an acquired intangible asset could be 
shown to have a limited useful life, then the capitalized acquisition costs were 
recoverable (deductible) over that asset's lifetime35 As a corollary, the 
capitalized cost of an intangible asset that had no definite useful life was not 
recoverable through depreciation but could only be recovered upon 
abandonment or disposition of the asset. 36 Under this legal framework, 
patents and copyrights were eligible for depreciation due to the fact that they 
have limited useful lives (statutory legal lives of 20 years in the case of patents, 
and 70, 95, or 120 years in the case of certain copyrights). 37 In contrast, other 
traditional intellectual property rights (trade secrets, trademarks, trade namesJ 
were not eligible for depreciation because they do not have limited lives. 3 
The same was true for goodwill; the costs of acquiring goodwill were not 
eligible for amortization allowances, as goodwill does not have an 
ascertainable limited life. 39 These early depreciation rules for recovering the 
capitalized costs of intangibles created several problems. 
One problem with the historic depreciation rule for intangibles was that it 
caused much litigation concerning the identification and valuation of intangible 
assets. 40 No deduction for depreciation was allowable with respect to 
goodwill, so taxpayers tried to distinguish intan¥ible assets from goodwill; the 
Service often challenged those determinations. 4 The touching point was that 
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960) ("If an intangible asset is known from experience or 
other factors to be ofuse in the business or in the production of income for only a limited period, 
the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be 
the subject ofa depreciation allowance."). 
36. Id. ("An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to the 
allowance for depreciation."). 
37. A patent confers the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for 
sale, or importing the claimed invention for a certain term of years (currently twenty years from 
the date of application). 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2), (d) (2001). Ownership of a valid copyright 
confers five exclusive rights for a limited time. Id. The Copyright Act, over the years, has 
lengthened the term of copyright protection. Currently, a work of authorship enjoys a term of the 
life of the author and seventy years thereafter. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2005). For works created 
under the doctrine of"works made for hire," the term is ninety-five years after first publication or 
120 years after creation. Id. § 302(c). 
38. There is no specific term of protection for trade secrets; the protection is available as 
long as confidential proprietary information is kept in secrecy, which could be indefinite. See 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT§ 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537-38 (1990). Likewise, there is no 
specific term of protection for trademarks and trade names; the protection is available as long as 
the trademark or trade name is used in commerce and has not been abandoned. See 15 U.S.C. § 
1127 (2009) (providing presumption of abandonment if nonuse of a trademark extends for three 
years). 
39. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property Right, 
56 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 14 n. 75 (2004) ("The prohibition against amortizing the cost of goodwill 
first appeared in Treas. Reg. §1.167(a)-3, which stated that '[n)o deduction for depreciation is 
allowable with respect to goodwill.' This prohibition first appeared in the regulations in 1927. 
See Kevin R. Conzelrnann, 533-2d T.M., Amortization ofIntangibles, A-5 & n.32 (2001) (citing 
T.D. 4055, VI-2 C. B. 63; Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 163 (Revenue Act ofl926)). 
40. See Catherine L. Hammond, The Amortization ofIntangible Assets: § 197 ofthe Internal 
Revenue Code Settles the ConfUsion, 27 CONN. L. REv. 915, 918 (1955) ("Because the 
determination of whether an intangible can be amortized was a question of fact, the outcome of 
such litigation varied widely according to the circumstances of each particular case."). 
41. Id. ("Additional confusion and litigation arose because the term 'goodwill' is not defined 
in the Code or in the regulations.'). 
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goodwill was viewed by the government as an umbrella covering all intangible 
assets of a business. This historical concept of goodwill led to considerable 
controversy between taxpayers and the Service. While taxpayers attempted to 
argue that a wide variety of intangible assets were independent assets severable 
from goodwill (and eligible for depreciation provided they had a limited useful 
life), the Service strongly held to the position that these intangible assets were 
indistinguishable or inseparable from goodwill (and not eligible for 
depreciation). 42 Clear guidance was needed for taxpayers who, for example, 
purchased patents along with certain associated trademarks and other 
intangibles. 
Even if patents and other intangible assets were capable of being separately 
identified and valued, controversies existed over the appropriate cost recovery 
methods and recovery periods for such assets. A common method for 
depreciating patent costs was the so-called "straight-line method," under which 
capitalized acquisition costs are deducted ratably over the asset's estimated 
useful life. 43 Application of this seemingly simple method raised a number of 
questions. For example, was the useful life of a patent the statutory legal life 
of the patent, or instead, the period over which the patent was reasonably 
expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his or her business or in the production 
of income? If the latter approach was appropriate, should the taxpayer 
establish useful life based upon some general industry standard, or should the 
taxpayer establish useful life of a patent based upon his or her own experiences 
with similar property? If useful life was based on taxpayer experiences, what 
was the appropriate standard in forecasting the asset's useful life? In 1969, the 
Service authorized a five-year amortization period for software acquisition 
costs rendering these questions moot for software44 
The usefulness of some patents is not adequately measurable by the passage 
of time alone but is more accurately measurable by the income the patent 
produces. As a result of distortions caused by the straight-line method, the 
Service eventually permitted patents to be depreciated under the so-called 
"income forecast method," under which costs are recovered as income is 
earned from exploitation of the patent. 45 The depreciation allowance in any 
given year is computed by multiplying the original capitalized acquisition cost 
of the patent by a fraction, the numerator of which is income from the patent 
for the taxable year, and the denominator of which is the forecasted or 
estimated total income to be earned in connection with the patent during its 
42. The controversy over whe1her to characterize intangible assets as goodwill was 
eventually settled wi1h 1he Supreme Court's decision in Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United 
States. 507 U.S. 546, 570 (1993). The Supreme Court held 1hat amortization of an intangible 
asset depends on whe1her 1he asset is capable ofbeing valued and whe1her the asset has a limited 
useful life. !d. The Court r~ected 1he Service's argument that a taxpayer must also prove 1hat 1he 
intangible is separate and distinct from goodwill. !d. 
43. Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(b)-1 (1960). 
44. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, supersededby Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-1 C.B. 601. 
45. Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, amplified by Rev. Rul. 64-273, 1964-2 C.B. 62, 
amplifiedby Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C. B. 91. 
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useful life. 46 While the income forecast method is perhaps more accurate in 
reflecting income than the straight-line method, its application is complex. It 
is often difficult to determine yearly and forecasted income for purposes of the 
above formula; revised computations are required if estimates are substantially 
overstated or underestimated as a result of circumstances that arise in later 
years, 47 and a complex set of "look back" rules may require a taxpayer to pay 
interest to the government if deductions were accelerated due to 
. . f d. 48undereshmatwn o expecte mcome. 
Another problem with the historical depreciation scheme stemmed from the 
fact that the rules for depreciating intangible intellectual property assets 
differed dramatically from the corresponding set of rules for depreciating 
tangible assets. Over time, Congress enacted a detailed set of arbitrary 
depreciation rules for all tangible assets. These Code provisions provided 
arbitrary conventions and methods for depreciating costs of tangible assets and, 
more importantly, provided artificially low recovery periods (e.g., three, five, 
and seven years) for many tangible assets that arguably have longer useful 
lives. 49 This disparate treatment between intellectual property assets and 
tangible assets created distortions that were unfair to taxpayers. 5°For example, 
taxpayers who acquired businesses with mostly tangible assets fared better 
than taxpayers who acquired businesses with mostly intellectual property 
assets, a problem that worsened as more and more valuable business assets 
took the form of intellectual property assets. 51 Seeking to mitigate these 
distortions, many saw the need to reconcile the treatment of acquired 
intangible assets with the treatment of acquired tangible assets. 52 
C. APPLYING GENERAL SALE PRINCIPLES TO PATENT DISPOSITIONS 
A transfer of property for consideration is treated for tax purposes as either a 
sale or a license-with significant tax differences depending on how the 
transfer is characterized. If a property transfer is considered a sale for tax 
purposes, then the transferor is permitted to recover tax-free any remaining 
46. The following simple example illustrates the computation: In Year 1, Taxpayer 
purchases a patent for $100 and estimates that forecasted total income from the patent will be 
$200. In Year 1, the patent generates income of$80. The depreciation allowance for Year 1 is 
$40, computed by multiplying the capitalized acquisition cost of $100 by the fraction obtained by 
dividing current year income of $80 by forecasted total income of $200. Under this approach, 
40% of forecasted income was earned in Year 1, so 40% of the total purchase cost was deducted 
in Year 1. SeeTreas. Reg.§ 1.167(n)-4(e), Ex. 1. 
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-4(b). 
48. !d. § l.l67(n)-6. 
49. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (2010) (providing a set of arbitrary rules for determining the 
appropriate depreciation allowance for all forms oftangible property, both personal and real). 
50. See Allen Walburn, Depreciation ofIntangibles: An Area of the Tax Law in Need of 
Change, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 453, 454-56 (1993) (explaining that the inequity between 
similarly situated taxpayers resulted in noncompliance and much litigation, which unnecessarily 
burdened the administration oftax law). 
51. See Conzelrnann, supra note 39, at A-3 & n.7 (citing Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. 
United States and noting that taxpayers with resources "had a much better success rate in 
litigation than poorer taxpayers"). 
52. !d. 
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basis in the property transferred, 53 and the resulting gain may be taxed at 
preferential capital gain rates rather than the much higher ordinary income 
rates. 54 If, however, the transfer is characterized as a license for tax purposes, 
the transferor is not permitted to recover any basis in the property, and the full 
amounts received must be reported and taxed as ordinary income rather than 
capital gain. Characterizing a transfer of tangible property as either a sale or 
license for tax purposes is relatively straightforward in most cases. If a 
property owner has fee simple title to a piece of land (i.e., owns the whole 
"bundle of sticks" or "attributes of ownership") and transfers title in fee simple 
to a buyer for consideration, a "sale" has occurred. Characterizing the transfer 
of intangible intellectual property rights under general tax principles is not as 
easy. 
Determining whether a patent transfer was a sale or license under general 
tax principles was the subject of many early court decisions. In contrast to 
most land transactions, wherein sellers transfer all attributes of ownership for a 
lump sum, patent transfers typically include numerous limitations and 
restrictions and often involve contingent payments resembling royalties. And 
so numerous courts were called upon to tackle hard questions: What are the 
substantial attributes of patent ownership? Must the entire bundle of rights 
(sticks) be given away for sale treatment, or may certain rights be retained? 
Should the existence of contingent payments preclude sale treatment even if all 
ownership rights were transferred? 
In establishing the basic criteria of a sale under general tax rules, courts held 
that a patent owner must transfer the exclusive right to make, use, and sell the 
patented article; anything short of that was not a sale but a license. 55 An 
53. I.R.C. § lOOl(a) (2010) (providing 1he amonnt ofgain on 1he sale ofproperty is equal to 
1he excess of the amonnt realized in the transaction over the amonnt of the taxpayer's adjusted 
basis in 1he property sold). 
54. Individual taxpayers generally prefer gains to be classified as capital gains ra1her than 
ordinary income because certain capital gains are afforded preferential tax treatment. Presently, 
the maximum rate at which most long-term capital gains are taxed is 15%, whereas the highest 
rate at which other types of income (ordinary income and short-term capital gains) are taxed is 
35o/o-a significant mte differential for high earners. See I.R.C. § l(a)-(d), (i)(l)-{2). Under 
general tax principles, preferential capital gain treatment requires a "sale or exchange" of a 
"capital asset." I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222 (2010). See JoHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MArnE, THE 
FuNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION 219 (2d ed. 2010) (giving several policy reasons for the 
tax rate preference accorded to capital gains). 
55. A large number of tax cases followed Waterman, one of the leading authorities dealing 
wi1h the transfer of patents. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U .S. 252 (1891). In 1hat case, 1he 
Supreme Court said: 
Whe1her a transfer of a particular right or interest nnder a patent is an 
assignment or a license does not depend upon the name by which it calls 
itself, but upon 1he legal effect of its provisions. For instance, a grant of an 
exclusive right to make, use, and vend two patented machines within a 
certain district is an assignment, and gives the grantee the right to sue in his 
own name for an infringement within 1he district, because the right, although 
limited to making, using, and vending two machines, excludes all other 
persons, even the patentee, from making, using, or vending like machines 
within 1he district. On the other hand, the grant of an exclusive right nnder 
the patent within a certain district, which does not include the right to make, 
and 1he right to use, and the right to sell, is not a grant of a title in 1he whole 
patent-right within the district, and is therefore only a license. Such, for 
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"exclusive license" to manufacture, use, and sell for the life of a patent would 
be considered a sale because, in substantive effect, all right, title, and interest 
in the property was transferred irrespective of the location ofl~al title or other 
formalities of language contained in the license agreement. 5 In contrast, a 
"nonexclusive license"~a transfer that granted the transferee only segregated 
or limited rights~would be considered a license rather than a sale. 57 For 
example, transfers with duration limitations, 58 transfers that divided the 
manufacturing of patents between the transferor and transferee, 59 and transfers 
that granted the right to make and sell but not the right to "use"60 were 
generally treated as licenses rather than sales for tax purposes. 
Under this broad framework, much litigation centered on determining what 
restrictions or limitations in particular patent agreements precluded a finding of 
a sale for tax purposes. Many patent assignments contain geographical 
limitations or field-of-use restrictions. Should the grant of an exclusive right to 
make, use, and sell a patent to only a certain geographical area be considered a 
sale for tax purposes, even though the transferor retained those rights with 
respect to all other geographical areas ?61 Similarly, should the grant of the 
exclusive right to make, use, and sell a patent to only a particular industry be 
considered a sale for tax purposes even though the transferor retained those 
instance, is a grant of '1he full and exclusive right to make and vend' wi1hin 
a certain district, reserving to the grantor 1he right to make wi1hin the 
district, to be sold outside of it. So is a grant of '1he exclusive right to make 
and use, ' but not to sell, patented machines within a certain district. So is an 
instrument granting '1he sole right and privilege of manufacturing and 
selling' patented articles, and not expressly au1horizing 1heir use, because, 
1hough this might carry by implication 1he right to use articles made under 
1he patent by 1he licensee, it certainly would not au1horize him to use such 
articles made by o1hers. 
Id at 255-56 (holding 1hat an agreement by which a patent owner granted "the sole and exclusive 
right and license to manufacture and sell" 1he patented article throughout 1he United States was 
not an assignment, but a license) (internal citations omitted). Watenne01 involved 1he question of 
who were 1he indispensable parties in an infringement suit. As a result, not all courts followed 
1he Court's view as to what constitutes a patent assignment for tax purposes. See, e.g, Bloch v. 
United States, 200 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1952) ("Different considerations were obviously involved, 
and 1he court's statement as to what constitutes an assignment of title to a patent is not necessarily 
controlling in 1he field of taxation.'). 
56. See, e.g., Rollman v. Comm'r, 244 F.2d 634 (41h Cir. 1957); Watson v. United States, 
222 F.2d 689 (101h Cir. 1955). 
57. Id 
58. See, e.g. , Oak Mfg. Co. v. United States, 301 F.2d 259, 263 (71h Cir. 1962); Bell 
Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1023 (Ct. Cl. 1967); PPG Indus., Inc. v. 
Comm'r, 55 T.C. 928, 1018 (1970); Gregg v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 291, 302 (1952), ajj'dper curium, 
203 F.2d 954, 955 (3d Cir. 1953). 
59. See, e.g, Am. Chern. Paint v. Smi1h, 131 F. Supp. 734, 739 (D.C. Pa. 1955). 
60. See, e.g., Broderick v. Neale, 201 F.2d 621, 624 (101h Cir. 1953); Nat'l Bread Wrapping 
Mach. Co. v. Comm'r, 30 T.C. 550,559 (1958); Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co. v. Comm'r, 10 
T.C. 974, 991 (1948), aff'dper curium, 177 F.2d 200, 200 (61h Cir. 1949). But see Rollman, 244 
F.2d at 641; C.A. Norgren Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 816, 825 (D.C. Colo. 1967); 
Flanders v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 935, 950 (D.C. Cal. 1959). 
61. For early cases holding 1hat transfers were sales for tax purposes despite geographical 
limitations, see Watson, 222 F.2d at 689; Crook v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 242, 253 (W.D. 
Pa. 1955); Marco v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 544, 549 (1955), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3. 
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rights with respect to all other industries? 62 Many patent agreements also 
contain certain restrictions that serve to protect the transferor, raising 
additional questions: Should a patent transfer be deemed a sale for tax 
purposes even though the transferor reserves the right to terminate in the event 
63
of transferee's insolvency, bankruptcy, or failure to make payments? Should 
a patent transfer be deemed a sale despite a restriction that the transferee 
cannot grant a sublicense without the written consent of the transferor, if the 
purchase price is paid in installments and the restriction served to protect the 
parties?64 Similarly, should the transferor's retention of the right to sue for 
infringement necessarily preclude a finding of a sale if the restriction is viewed 
. d . ?65as a secunty ev1ce. 
In addition to struggling with these important questions, the government and 
courts also struggled with the impact, if any, that contingent payments should 
have on the "license versus sale" determination. In contrast to real property 
transactions, which often involve lump sum or installment payments, patent 
agreements typically involv e payments measured by the production, sale, or 
use by the transferee, or payments payable over a period generally coterminous 
with the transferee's use of the patent. And so the question arose: should a 
patent assignment be denied sale treatment solely because the purchase price 
took the form of contingent payments? Early cases were split on the issue. 
Some courts held that the receipt of contingent payments did not prevent a 
transfer from being considered a sale, 66 while others held that the receipt of 
contingent payments did preclude sale treatment. 67 The Service itself 
struggled with the issue. In a 1950 administrative pronouncement, the Service 
ruled that an assignment of a patent (or the exclusive license to make, use, and 
sell a patented article) would nevertheless be treated as a license for tax 
purposes (and, hence, payments received by inventors would be taxed as 
62. For early cases holding 1hat transfers were sales despite field-of-use restrictions, see 
Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162, 165-66 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Carru1hers, 219 
F.2d 21, 24- 25 (91h Cir. 1955); Flanders, 172 F. Supp. at 950; First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. 
United States, 136 F. Supp. 818, 824 (D.C.N.J. 1955); Rouverol v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 186, 194 
(1964), nonacq., 1965-2 C.B. 3. But see Am. Chern. Paint Co. v . Smith, 131 F. Supp. 734, 739 
(D.C. Pa. 1955). 
63. For early cases holding that transfers were sales despite cancellation rights, see Comm 'r 
v. Celanese Corp., 140 F.2d 339, 341-42 (D.C. Cir. 1944); First Nat '/ Bank ofPrinceton, 136 F. 
Supp. at 824; Myers v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 258, 265-66, acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3. But see Blake v. 
Comm'r, 615 F.2d 731, 734-35 (61h Cir. 1980), rev 'g 67 T.C. 7 (1976). 
64. For early cases holding 1hat transfers were sales despite sublicensing restrictions, see 
Rollman, 244 F.2d at 641; Crook, 135 F. Supp. at 253. 
65. For early cases holding that transfers were sales despite such retention rights, see 
Watson, 222 F.2d at 689; Celanese Cop., 140 F.2d at 341-42; Graham v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 730, 
741-43 (1956), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3. 
66. See, e.g., Celanese Cop., 140 F.2d 341 - 42; Comm'r v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406, 411­
12 (2d Cir. 1942). 
67. See, e.g., Bloch v. United States, 200 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1952) (stating that, al1hough many 
substantial rights in 1he patent retained by plaintiff were indications of 1he failure to transfer 
absolute ownership, "1he crux of the matter seems to us to be the retention of an interest in the 
profitable exploitation of 1he patented articles by receipt of a percentage of the sales price or a 
stated amount for each article sold," and 1hat "(w]ithout such an interest there would be less need 
to keep the oilier rights retained here"). 
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ordinary income) where the transferor received interests resembling 
royalties. 68 Five years later, the Service issued another ruling reiterating its 
position. 69 In 1958, however, the Service revoked its earlier position and ruled 
that patent transferors could enjoy "sale" treatment (and, hence, capital gain 
treatment) even though consideration received is measured by production, use, 
or sale of the patented article. 70 
Without specific rules governing patent transfers, courts struggled with the 
attributes of patent ownership when examining individual patent agreements in 
their factual context. A framework slowly evolved~a framework that clearly 
challenged normative notions of what was and what was not a sale for tax 
purposes. Indeed, it was possible for a court to conclude that a patent 
agreement was a sale for tax purposes, even though the agreement was titled 
"License Agreement," the parties therein were designated "Licensor" and 
"Licensee," the agreement contained geographical limitations and field-of-use 
and other restrictions, and the agreement called for "royalty" payments 
contingent on the use or exploitation of the patent by the transferee. 7 In light 
of the inherent factual nature of the "sale versus license" distinction, in 
general, and the unique characteristics of patent ownership, in particular, there 
was a need for a set of predictable tax rules. 
III. SOURCES OF EARLY DISSONANCE BETWEEN THE 

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TAXATION REGIMES 

A. ACCEPTING INTELLECfUAL PROPERTY As PROPERTY 
Different types of intellectual property rights were treated as 
property by courts in the late nineteenth century. For example, in 
1868, the court in Peabody v. Norfolk recognized that a trade secret 
is property. 72 And later the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
68. Mimeogmph 6490, C.B. 1950-1, 9 ("[W]here the owner of a patent enters into an 
agreement whereby, in consideration of the assignment of the patent, or the license of the 
exclusive right to make, use, and sell a patented article, the assignee or licensee agrees to pay to 
the assignor or licensor an amount measured by a fixed percentage of the selling price of the 
article so manufactured and sold, or amounts per unit based upon units manufactured or sold, or 
any other method measured by production, sale, or use either by assignee or licensee, or amounts 
payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the transferee's use of the patent, 
such agreement, for income tax purposes, is to be regarded as providing for the payment of 
royalties taxable as ordinary income.'). 
69. Rev. Rul. 55-58, 1955-1 C.B. 97. 
70. Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 C.B. 408. 
71. E.g., Watson v. United States, 222 F.2d 689 (lOth Cir. 1955). 
72. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868) ("If he invents or discovers, and 
keeps secret, a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not 
indeed an exclusive right to it as against the public, or against those who in good faith acquire 
knowledge of it; but he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one 
who in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to 
disclose it to third persons.' ) (emphasis added); Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 
111, 115 (Sup. Ct. 1892), aff'd, 29 N.Y.S. 1143 (Sup. Ct. 1894); see also Luckett v. Orange Julep 
Co., 196 S.W. 740, 743-44 (Mo. 1917) (citing cases for the established law that a trade secret is 
property). 
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regulation requiring the disclosure of a trade secret was a taking of 
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 73 Courts have long 
recognized patents as property. 74 Providing property rights in 
patents encourages efficient investment and leads to more 
innovations. 75 Similarly, early court decisions routinely held that 
copyrights were property. 76 Courts relied on authorities dating back 
to the Statute of Anne that recognized copyrights as property. 77 
Regarding trademarks, courts in early years held that trademarks 
were "a distinct property, separate from the article created by the 
original producer" and could be transferred together with the 
associated establishment. 78 In these early decisions, courts observed 
73. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984); Philip Morris, Inc. v. 
Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45-47 (lst Cir. 2002) (en bane) (holding that a state regulation requiring 
disclosure of the content of cigarettes was a taking of trade secrets); see also E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 912 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (holding the nonexclusive 
transfer of a trade secret was a sale su~ect to capital gains tax treatment; DVD Copy Control 
Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 14 (Cal. 2003) (holding that trade secrets represent a "constitutionally 
recognized property interest in [information)"); 1 RoGER M. MILGRlM, MILGRlM ON TRADE 
SECRETS § 2.01, at 2-11 (2000) (stating that "[p )ractically all jurisdictions have recognized that a 
trade secret is property" at least in certain senses); Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of 
Trade Sec rets in Anglo-American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RlcH. L. REv. 313 (1997) 
(offering a critical analysis of trade secret histozy). 
74. Stuart v. City of Easton, 170 U.S. 383, 392 (1898) ("[W)e find a recital in the patent that 
it is conveyed upon a named consideration, and the patent expressly refers to the act of the 
assembly as the authority from which the patentees derived the power to take and hold the 
property."); Butterworth v. United States ex rei. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 59 (1884) ("The legislation 
based on this provision regards the right of property in the inventor as the medium of the public 
advantage derived from his invention; so that in every grant of the limited monopoly two interests 
are involved: that of the public, who are the grantors, and that of the patentee.'); Wilson v. 
Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 674-75 (1846) ("[U)nless the executor or administrator is 
permitted to take the place of the patentee in case ofhis death, and make application for the grant 
of the second term, which continues the exclusive enjoyment of the right of property in the 
invention, the o~ect of the statute will be defeated, and a valuable right of property, intended to 
be secured, lost to his estate."); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 59 1, 658 (1834) ("And yet it 
has never been pretended that the latter could hold, by the common law, any property in his 
invention, after he shall have sold it publicly."). 
75. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31 
(2002) ("The patent laws 'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ' by rewarding 
innovation with a temporary monopoly. The monopoly is a property right; and like any property 
right, its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote progress, because it 
enables efficient investment in innovation."). 
76. See, e.g., Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 692 ("The title, and this section of the act, 
obviously consider and treat this copyright as property; something that is capable of being 
transferred; and the right of the assignee is protected equally with that of the author.'). The Court 
in Wheaton noted that the state ofVirginia ''in the year 1785, passed a similar law, for securing to 
authors ofliterazy works, an exclusive property therein, for a limited time." Id at 683; see also 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C. C. D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (Story, J.) ("The entirety of 
the copyright is the property of the author, and it is no defence, that another person has 
appropriated a part, and not the whole, of any property."); Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 967, 
970 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 1,076) ("Bartlett's right of property in his manuscript may be 
transferred or abandoned, the same as any other right ofproperty.' ). 
77 . See Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 697 ('"The language in the Statute of Anne, which is 
considered as vesting the right, is the same as in the act ofcongress."). 
78. See Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 61 7, 620 (18 79) ("As distinct property, separate from the 
article created by the original producer or manufucturer, it may not be the subject of sale. But 
when the trade-mark is affixed to articles manufactured at a particular establishment and acquires 
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that trademarks were valuable to the owners because they signified 
the quality of the goods or services and assured the public that the 
goods or services offered were the genuine product of the 
manufacturers and owners. 79 
Although it was well-established that intellectual property was property, 
many early tax cases struggled to identify when intangible intellectual property 
rights constituted separable property for tax purposes. Such a determination is 
critical in numerous tax contexts. For example, application of the asset­
capitalization rule to intellectual property development costs hinged on 
whether the research activity resulted in an identifiable asset. Application of 
early tax depreciation rules to intellectual property acquisition costs centered 
on whether an intangible asset existed and whether, in a business acquisition, 
the value of the intangible was reasonably determinable. The "property" 
question is central to determining the property tax treatment of any disposition. 
For instance, preferential capital gain treatment requires a sale of a capital 
asset. 
80 If one could not first conclude that the object of a transfer was 
property, then how could there be a sale-much less a sale of a capital asset­
for tax purposes? 
As described in this Part, the government and courts often struggled with the 
competing concepts of property that could yield different tax results. In some 
cases, courts and tax authorities cleverly avoided the property issue when 
resolving a particular tax question, which did nothing to guide future decisions. 
In some transactional contexts, the approach adopted was to declare attributes 
of intellectual property ownership irrelevant and to instead focus on the 
tangible medium embodying the intellectual property. 
a special reputation in connection with the place of manufacture, and that establishment is 
transferred either by contract or operation oflaw to others, the right to the use of the trade-mark 
may be lawfully transferred with it.'). In later years, courts permitted transfers of trademarks 
together with the associated goodwill, without the need for transfers of the business. See 
generally JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.3d 390 (2d Cir. 2009); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. 
Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1289 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., 
Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 676 (7th Cir. 1982)) (noting that for a trademark assignment to confer rights 
on the purchaser, goodwill must accompany the assignment, but "[i]t is not necessary that the 
entire business or its tangible assets be transferred"); accord Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham 
Trust Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1982) ("A valid transfer of a mark, however, 
does not require the transfer ofany physical or tangible assets. All that is necessary is the transfer 
of the goodwill to which the mark pertains."). For another early decision mentioning trademarks 
as property, see Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51, 6&--67 (1879) ("Trade-marks usually exhibit 
some peculiar device, vignette, or symbol, in addition to the name of the party, which the 
proprietor had a perfect right to appropriate, and which, as well as the name, is intended as a 
declaration to the public that the article is his property."). 
79. See Manhattan Med. Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1883) ("Any one has as 
unquestionable right to affix to articles manufactured by him a mark or device not previously 
appropriated, to distinguish them from articles ofthe same general character manufactured or sold 
by others. He may thus notifY the public of the origin of the article, and secure to himself the 
benefits of any particular excellence it may possess from the manner or materials of its 
manufucture. His trade-mark is both a sign ofthe quality of the article and an assurance to the 
public that it is the genuine product ofhis manufacture. It thus often becomes of great value to 
him, and in its exclusive use the court will protect him against attempts ofothers to pass off their 
products upon the public as his. This protection is afforded not only as a matter ofjustice to him, 
but to prevent imposition upon the public.') (citing Trainer, 101 U.S. at 54). 
80. See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 54, at 220. 
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In the marketplace, copyrights could be divided and the exclusive rights to 
copyrighted works in one medium of publication could be sold separately 81 
Likewise, trademarks could be divided into separately transferable fractions 
according to the usage of the market in which the trademarked goods move. 82 
For tax purposes, however, should these marketplace concepts of property (the 
splitting up of bundles of rights) be accepted, or should traditional property 
concepts (the law relating to the passage of title) be adopted? In determining 
the appropriate tax result of a particular intellectual property transfer, the 
competing concepts of property could lead to different results. \.Vhile there 
was much initial uncertainty and litigation over the divisibility of copyrights, 
trademarks, and trade names for tax purposes, most courts eventually focused 
on ownership ofbeneficial interests as opposed to legal title. 
In the case of copyrights, the Service and some courts initially adopted the 
view that a copyright was not divisible into separable properties and that a 
grant of less than all the rights conferred by a copyright was not a sale for tax 
purposes but rather a license. 83 In one case involving an assignment of the 
exclusive motion picture rights to a play that the taxpayer had created, the 
Second Circuit adhered to traditional property concepts, stating: 
\.Vhen . . the assignee acquires less than the sum of all the 
rights which together make up the copyright which as a whole 
is property and may be conveyed as such, . the so-called 
assignment amounts only to a license. Unless the 
assignment conveys to the assigned the title to the copyright, 
84
no sale of property is made. 
Some courts later accepted market concepts and held that a copyright was 
81. The Copyright Act of 1976 lists important rights of copyright ownership and provides 
that these rights may be subdivided. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); see also id § 20l(d)(2) 
(providing that "[a)ny ofthe exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision 
of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and 
owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to ilie extent of iliat 
right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to ilie copyright owner by this title'). Under 
substantive copyright law, "[c)opyright protection subsists ... in original works of auiliorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression" including "(1) literary works; (2) musical works, 
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) 
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works." Id § 
102(a). 
82. See New York & Rosendale Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 45 F. 212, 212-13 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1891) (" In holding iliat it is necessary to ilie validity of a trade-mark or trade-name 
that ilie claimant of it must be entitled to an exclusive right to it, or property in it, we do not mean 
to say that it may not belong to more than one person, to be enjoyed jointly or severally. 
Copartners, upon a dissolution ofpartnership may stipulate iliat each ofiliem may use the trade­
marks ofilie firm, and there may be many oilier cases ofjoint and several ownership; but such co­
owners will together be entitled to ilie exclusive use of the trade-mark, and perhaps each of them 
will be entitled to such exclusive use as to all oilier persons except their associates in 
ownership.'); Gary H. Moore, Joint Ownership ofIntellectual Property: Issues andApproaches 
in Strategic Alliances, 1260 PLI/CoRP 313, 321 (2001) (discussing the practice of several owners 
owning ilie same trademark in different fields ofuse). 
83. For ilie Service's view, see I.T. 2735, 12-2 C.B. 131 (1933). For one court's view, see 
Goldsmiili v. Comm 'r, 143 F.2d 466, 467 (2d Cir. 1944), aff'g 1 T.C. 711 (1943). 
84. Id at 467. 
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divisible for tax purposes. 85 And the Service later conceded, ruling that a 
grant (for a lump sum payment) of the exclusive right to exploit a copyrighted 
work "in a medium ofpublication throughout the life of the copyright transfers 
. h" d. 1 c 86a property ng t an 1s a sa e ~or tax purposes. 
In the case of trademarks and trade names, a similar debate occurred over 
divisibility and appropriate concepts of property. The monopoly a trademark 
or trade name owner is granted by the government is a property right. Such 
right may be assigned or transferred, for example, in a limited territory. 
Should such a grant, which does not dispose of the entire property of the 
grantor, be treated as a sale or a license for tax purposes? Courts addressing 
this particular issue generally concluded that sale treatment was proper, even 
though the grantor retained naked, legal title. 87 
In some difficult cases, courts avoided the property question when resolving 
a particular tax conflict involving intellectual property. Consider the issue of 
whether the assignment of an abstract idea should be entitled to preferential 
capital gain treatment. The Code defines a "capital gain" as gain from the 
"sale or exchange" of a "capital asset. " 88 Since 1950, the Code has 
specifically excluded from the definition of capital asset "a copyright, a 
literary, musical, or artistic composition, ... or similar property, held by a 
taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property. " 89 
In Regenstein v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, an insurance agent, developed 
an idea or plan for selling group life insurance to federal government 
employees. 90 He sold his plan to an insurance company for $10,000. The 
issue before the court was whether that amount was taxable as ordinary income 
(the government's argument) or as capital gain (the taxpayer' s argument)91 
The court concluded that the amount was taxable as ordinary income because 
the payment was for services rendered by the taxpayer to the life insurance 
companies. 92 Although the court expressed doubt as to whether the taxpayer' s 
85. See Gershwin v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 477, 480 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (holding that the 
transaction was "a sale of a portion of [theJ decedent's rights in the musical composition"); 
Herwig v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384, 389 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (holding that the transfer to a film 
corporation constituted a sale ofall the plaintiff's motion pictures rights in the novel). 
86. Rev. Rul. 54-409, 1954-2 C.B. 174 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the 
Service' s ruling applied only if the consideration received was not contingent (i.e., "measured by 
a percentage of the receipts from the sale, performance, or publication of the copyrighted work, 
[wa)s not measured by the number of copies sold, performances given, or exhibitions made ofthe 
copyrighted work, and [wa)s not payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with 
the grantee's use ofthe copyrighted work"). Id 
87. See, e.g, Rainier Brewing Co. v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 162, 174 (1946), aif'dper curiam, 165 
F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1948); Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Comm 'r, 6 T.C. 856, 871, affdper 
curiam, 165 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1946) ("We see no inhibition, where a corporation owns a trade 
name, to its assigning a right to use that name in a designated territory for a price, and if the right 
to use is perpetual and exclusive it is more consistent with the idea of a sale than a lease, 
particularly where it is not dissociated from the business or merchandise with which it has been 
used."). 
88. Id § 1222(3) (2006). 
89. See I.R.C. § 122l(a)(3)(A), discussed infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. 
90. 35 T.C. 183 (1960). 
91. See id at 183. 
92. See id at 190. 
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idea could be considered property, it specifically left the issue undecided and 
instead focused on whether the payment was for services rendered by the 
93 
taxpayer. 
In a similar case, Cranford v. United States, the taxpayer conceived and 
invented a format or structure for a radio program. 94 The taxpayer, who was 
unable to obtain a copyright on either the radio program or the essential feature 
of the proposed program, subsequently assigned and conveyed all of his title 
and interest in the radio program, conceived and invented by him, to an 
umelated company in return for a percentage of payments received by the 
company in connection with the licensing of the use of the program. The tax 
issue before the court was whether these payments were taxable as ordinary 
income (the government's argument) or as capital gains (the taxpayer's 
argument). 95 Despite the government's contention that the taxpayer's format 
or idea was not property, the court instead focused at length on whether the 
radio format was a capital asset; specifically, the court addressed whether the 
radio format was "similar" to literary, musical, or artistic compositions and, as 
such, within the capital asset exclusion. 96 The taxpayer argued that his 
"format" was not copyrightable and was not one of the specifically named 
items, and thus, the format was not excluded from the definition of a capital 
asset. 97 The court rejected the taxpayer's argument and held that the format 
. 1 98was not a cap1ta asset. 
The courts in Regenstein and Cranford found a way to resolve the tax 
disputes at issue but provided an inappropriate framework for similar future 
cases. A preliminary issue in each case should have been whether the ideas 
constituted property. If they were incapable of being property held by the 
taxpayer, then how could there have been a sale-much less a sale of a capital 
asset? 
The Service avoided the property issue in determining the tax consequences 
of using intellectual property in corporate capitalizations. The transfer of 
intellectual property to a corporation in exchange for stock in that corporation 
is potentially a taxable event99 But a special Code provision, section 351, 
provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized upon the transfer by one or 
more persons of property to a corporation solely in exchange for stock in such 
93. See id. ("While there exists grave doubt here whether petitioner's plan or idea was one 
that could be considered to be property, and, further, if it were considered property, whether it 
would not come within the exclusion of property similar to a copyright, literary, musical, or 
artistic composition, we need not decide these questions, since in our view the facts taken as a 
whole support respondent's contention that the payment was for services rendered . to 
Metropolitan and its associated companies.") (citations omitted). 
94. 338 F.2d 379 (Ct. Cl. 1964). 
95. !d. at 380. 
96. !d. at 382. 
97. !d. at 381. 
98. !d. at 384. 
99. The receipt of stock in exchange for property is a realization event for tax pmposes, with 
the amount of gain realized equaling the value of the stock received minus the adjusted basis of 
the property exchanged. I.R.C. § lOOl(a). As a general rule, the gain is reportable unless an 
exception is provided in the Code. Id § lOOl(c). 
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corporation if, after the exchange, such person or persons are in control of the 
100
corporation. An important requirement for nonrecognition treatment under 
section 351 is that property must be transferred by the shareholder to the 
corporation. An issue that arose was whether intangibles, such as technical 
know-how, constituted property that could be transferred to a corporation
101
without gain recognition under section 351. 
In Revenue Ruling 64-56, the Service took the position that the transfer of 
"all substantial rights" in technical know-how would be treated as a transfer of 
102property for purposes of section 351 of the Code. Soon after announcing its 
position, the Service was asked to address whether a nonexclusive license of a 
patent was property under section 351. In Revenue Ruling 69-156, the 
taxpayer granted certain patent rights in a chemical compound to its foreign 
subsidiary corporation in exchange for stock in the subsidiary, retaining for 
itself the substantial rights to import, use, and sell the chemical compound in 
103
the country in which the subsidiary operated. The Service concluded that 
the transferee subsidiary did not have all substantial rights in the patent, and, 
therefore, the grant of the patent ri~hts did not constitute a transfer of property
04
within the meaning of section 351. 
In these rulings, the Service skirted the issue of whether intangibles were 
property under section 351 and instead focused on whether the grant of 
intangibles would constitute a sale rather than a license for capital gain 
purposes (i.e. , whether the grant consisted of all substantial rights). In the 
Service's view, if a transaction did not qualify as a sale for capital gain 
purposes, it could not be a transfer of property for section 351 purposes. One 
court was quick to eschew this approach. In E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 
v. United States, the United States Court of Claims held that a nonexclusive 
105license of patents was property covered by section 351. Determining that 
section 351 was an autonomous provision, the court declared capital gain 
concepts (in particular, the sale versus license distinction) irrelevant. 106 In 
holding that the nonexclusive license was property, the court stated: "Both 
patents themselves and the exclusive licensing of patents have long been 
considered 'property' under 351. It is not a far step to include a non-exclusive 
license of substantial value-commonly thought of in the commercial world as 
a positive business asset. " 107 A few years after DuPont, the Service changed 
its position, stating that it no longer believed that "all substantial rights in 
'know-how' or a patent held by the transferor must be transferred in order to 
constitute the transfer of property for purposes of [section] 351." 108 
100. !d. § 351(a). 
101. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133. 
102. !d. 
103. Rev. Rul. 69-156, 1969-1 C.B. 101. 
104. !d. 
105. 47 1 F.2d 1211, 1218 (Ct. Cl. 1973). 
106. !d. at 1217- 18. 
107. !d. at 1218. 
108. See I.R.S. Gen. Corms. Mern. 36,922 (Nov. 16, 1976). 
123 
NGUYENMAINE W KG 6 / 14 /2011 8:37AM 
20 11] The History ofIntellectual Property Taxation 
B. RECONCILING SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES AMONG INTELLECTUAL 

PROPERTIES 

The four traditional forms of intellectual property share some common 
characteristics. 109 They are all intangible personal property; they have no 
physical form. 110 One cannot really touch them and feel them as one can 
touch land and feel the texture of the soli 111 They generally depend on 
physical forms for their creative existence. 112 For a modem example, the 
trademark Coca-Cola written on this page has only slight meaning, but when it 
appears on a red beverage can, it becomes a powerful symbol of a globally 
recognized product. 113 Likewise, the copyright for Dan Brown's The Da Vinci 
Code requires either a book, CD, or other tangible medium embodying the 
words of the novel. 114 The patent for Viagra needs the actual pills to carry out 
the potent effects claimed by the pharmaceutical company. 115 The trade secret 
in the soft drink Coca-Cola is embodied in the brown liquid flowing from the 
109. See 1 J. THOMAS McCARTIIY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAlR 
CoMPETITION § 6:4 (4th ed. 1997) ("That there are many common characteristics of patents, 
trademarks and copyrights cannot be denied. They all share the attributes of personal property, 
and are referred to en masse as 'intellectual property' or 'proprietary rights.'"); see also Xuan­
Thao N. Nguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1267, 1297- 98 (2004) 
(describing the common characteristics between trademarks and other types of intellectual 
property such as patents, copyrights, and trade secrets). 
110. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, 42 GA. L. REv. 1, 34 
n.180 (2007) (noting that there is no physical form of intellectual property collateral for the 
secured party to seize when the debtor defaults on the loan); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural 
Rights: Hegel andIntellec tual Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 453,499 (2006) (observing that the 
"objects of intellectual property have no separate, natural, empirical existence. They 'exist' 
contingently and only insofu as not only their creator, but also other subjects, recognize them as 
such."); Kyle Lundeen, Note, Searching for a Defense: The Google Library Litigation and the 
Fair Use Doctrine, 75 UMKC L. REv. 265, 280 (2006) (noting that intellectual property has no 
physical form). 
111. See Darren Hudson Hick, Finding a Foundation: Copyright and the Creative Ac t, 17 
TEx. lNTELL. PRoP. L.J. 363, 377 (2009) (noting that "[u)nlike physical property, intellectual 
property is not something one can trespass upon"). 
112. See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights lvfanagement 
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 537, 538 (2005) (stating that intellectual property is generally 
"ern bodied in particular physical forms-on paper, on canvas, on magnetic or optical media-that 
can be guarded from a physical theft"). 
113. See Justin E.D. Daily, Intellectual Property for a Wired World, 11 APR Bus. L. ToDAY 
43 , 45 (2002) (''There are relatively few people in this world who do not recognize the Nike 
swoosh or the Coca-Cola calligraphy."); A vi J. Stachenfeld & Christopher M. Nicholson, Blurred 
Boundaries: An Analysis of the Close Relationship Between Popular Culture and the Practice of 
Law, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 903, 906 (1996) (noting Coca-Cola among the few powerful symbols 
recognized globally). 
114. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the 
New Economics ofDigital Technology, 69 U . CHI. L. REv . 263, 270 (2002) (analogizing that the 
distribution of "copyrighted works in the form of books, CDs, and videos was similar to the 
distribution ofwine" to the public). 
115. See MEIKA LOE, THE RlsE OF VIAGRA: How THE LITILE BLUE PILL CHANGED SEX IN 
AMERICA 15 (2004) (observing that after five years ofViagra introduction to the public, the drug 
"continued to net over a billion dollars a year"); Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Reports China Has Lifted 
Its Viagra Patent, Nl'TIMES. COM (July 8, 2004), 
http :1/www nytirn es.com/ 2004/07 /08/business/ pfizer-reports-china-has-hfted-i ts-viagra­
patent htrnl (reporting on patent protection for Viagra and rampant imitations of Viagra in 
violation of the patent in Asia). 
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tin can or bottle into our bodies to satisfY our thirst and enhance our 
. 116
enJoyment. 
These four types of intellectual property, though we cannot see them, touch 
1 7 them, or feel them, are everywhere. They exist wherever the ~hysical or 
digital forms embodying them are transported and in existence. 11 We can 
find a can of Coca-Cola, a pill of Viagra, or a book copy of TheDa Vinci Code 
in China, Ukraine, Brazil, France or anywhere else in the world, even in outer 
space, if the owners take them there. 119 
These four types of intellectual property (the trademark Coca-Cola, the 
Viagra patents, the trade secrets in the Coca-Cola drink, and the copyright for 
The Da Vinci Code) can easily be duplicated, multiplied, and distributed 
worldwide. 120 The intellectual property owners or authorized licensees and 
distributors can copyi manufacture, and distribute the products covered by the 
121 22 . 123 124trademark, patent, copynght, and trade secret. 
116. See Chris Mercer, Three Charged over Coca-Cola Trade Secrets Theft, DAILY 
BEVERAGE (July 6, 2006), http ://www.beveragedaily.com/Industry-Markets!Tirree-charged-over­
Coca-Cola-trade-secrets-theft (reporting that the FBI and Coca-Cola caught three people involved 
in trade secret theft of Coca-Cola product in liquid containers); Indic tment Handed Down in 
Coca-Cola Trade Secret Case, AlLANTA Bu s. CHRON., (July 12, 2006, 12:17 AM), 
http://atlanta.bizj ournals.corn/atlanta/stories/2006/07/1 O/daily23 htrnl (detailing the Coca-Cola 
trade secret theft indictment). 
11 7. See Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9: National 
and International Conflicts, 23 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 313, 356 (2001) ("Intellectual 
property, as an intangible, has no fixed situs. It is simultaneously everywhere ....'). 
118. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Holding Intellectual Property, 39 GA. L. REv. 1155, 1185~86 
(2005) (observing the intangible nature of intellectual property); Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, 
Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the Form(Gen) of the Alleged 
Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 991, 995~96 (2004) 
(noting that a work of authorship, an intangible property protected under copyright law, is 
separate from the tangible object in which work is fixed). 
119. See Phil Mooney, Coke in Space, CocA-COLA CONVERSATIONS BLOG (Feb. 29, 2008, 
11:34 EST), http://www.coca-colaconversations.com/rny ~weblog/2008/02/coke-in-space htrnl; 
see also The New World of Coca-Cola, CocA-COLA, http://www.thecoca­
colacornpany.com/presscenter/presskit~nwocc~fucts htrnl (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
120. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchornovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three 
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 1015, 1047-48 (2008) (observing that the intellectual property 
law regime recognizes and protects the rights in the "intangible" assets which are apart from the 
physical embodiments that are used for marketing purposes); Warren E. Agin & Scott N. Kurnis, 
A Framework for Understanding Electronic Information Transactions, 15 ALB. L.J. Scr. & TEcH. 
277, 309~313 (2005) (discussing intellectual property rights and their wide range of 
embodiments). 
121. SeeK Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 326~27 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (noting that "a firm that used its trademark in one business, say 
manufacturing cola syrup, could transfer rights to use the trademark in another business, such as 
bottling cola-flavored soda"); see also Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796, 
806--D8 (D. Del. 1920); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 272 
(1916) ("The right to use a trademark is recognized as a kind ofproperty, ofwhich the owner is 
entitled to the exclusive enj oyrnent to the extent that it has been actually used."). 
122. The owner of a patent can license its patent to a third party for commercial exploitation, 
as it so wishes. "Compulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system." Dawson Chern. Co. v. 
Rohrn & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting "the long-settled view that the essence of a 
patent grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention"). 
123. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 , 495~96 (2001) (stating that "[t]he 1976 
[Copyright] Act recast the copyright as a bundle of discrete 'exclusive rights "' under 17 U.S.C. § 
106 and provided that each '"may be transferred ... and owned separately"); see also Fox Film 
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The four types of intellectual property, though their physical embodiments 
are everywhere, share some similarities with respect to exclusivity rights. 125 
That means, if one person, group, or company has the right, no others can have 
it. 126 For example, the owner of a trademark has the right to exclude others 
from using an identical or similar trademark for the same or similar products or 
services if the use is likely to cause consumer confusion. 127 The owner of a 
patent can exclude others from using, making, selling, or exporting the 
patented products. 128 The owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights to 
make copies, prepare derivative works, distribute the copyrighted work, 
publicly perform the work, and publicly display the work. 129 The owner of a 
trade secret can bring a misappropriations case against others for unauthorized 
130 
use of its trade secret. 
Despite their similarities, there are many differences among these four types 
of intellectual property. Patents and copyrights are unique. Both patents and 
copyrights are specific grants dictated by the U.S. Constitution to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts. 131 The constitutional mandate for 
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ('"The owner of1he copyright, ifhe pleases, may refrain 
from vending or licensing and content himself wi1h simply exercising 1he right to exclude o1hers 
from using his property."). 
124. See Dresser-Rand Co. v. Virtual Automation Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 837 (51h Cir. 2004) 
(noting provision in 1he license agreement to protect the trade secret in the sale and distribution of 
the products). 
125. The exclusive rights for intellectual property have been observed as "worthless unless an 
owner remains vigilant in 1he policing of potential infringers." Jennifer A. Crane, Riding the 
Tiger: A Comparison of Intellectual Property Rights in the United States and the People's 
Republic ofChina, 7 CH:r.-KENT J. INTELL. PRoP. 95 , 104 (2008). 
126. See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How Intellectual 
Property Rights May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TEcH. 381 , 390 (2008) (stating 1hat the most salient characteristic of intellectual 
property is the negative right, "setting exclusive rights to particular parties and excluding others 
from infringing on their monopoly. Such exclusive rights can be generally transferred, licensed . 
. . . "). With respect to patents, "[i)f granted, a patent provides a right to exclude others from 
practicing an invention." Engage, Inc. v. Jalbert (In reEngage, Inc.), 544 F.3d 50, 53-54 (1st 
Cir. 2008). The court further observes that " [t]his exclusive right is 'a species ofproperty ... of 
the same dignity as any other property which may be used to purchase patents."' Id. (quoting 
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 643 (1947) (alteration in 
original)). 
127. See Peter Lee, The Evolution ofIntellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REv. 39, 39 
(2008) (recognizing that ''intellectual property law promotes productivity through allowing 
exclusive rights on refined intellectual creations such as source-identifYing marks, particularized 
expressions, and specific inventions"). 
128. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (stating that ''the 
Patent Act also declares 1hat ' patents shall have the attributes ofpersonal property,' including 'the 
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention"' (citing 35 
U.S.C. §§ 261, 154(a)). 
129. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1984) 
("[T)he Copyright Act grants the copyright holder 'exclusive' rights to use and to au1horize the 
use ofhis work in five qualified ways, including reproduction ofcopyrighted work in copies.'). 
130. See McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 569 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(affirming jury verdict on copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation); Inter Med. 
Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446, 458, 461-63 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming jury 
verdict on trade secrets violation claims and vacating excessive damages). 
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Margaret Chon, Postmodem "Progress": 
Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 97 (1993); Michael J. 
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patents and copyrights speaks volumes as to the intent of the Founders with 
. h C' . 132 h .respect to patents and copyng ts lOr a young natlon. T ere 1s no 
constitutional mandate for trademarks and trade secrets as with patents and 
. h 1" h 1 f . 1 .copyng ts. 133 Congress re 1es on t e Commerce Cause o Artlc e I, Sectlon 8 
to pass federal law on trademarks. 134 Congress enacts legislation (e.g., the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996) to prevent theft of trade secrets and to make 
such theft a federal crime. 135 
The legal life of a patent is dictated under the federal patent statute and lasts 
twenty years from the date of patent application. 136 The legal life of a 
copyright under the federal copyright statute sRans the life of the original 
author plus seventy years after his or her death. 37 If the author is an entity, 
the life of the copyright is 120 years from the date of sublication or 95 years 
from the date of registration, whichever expires first. 1 8 For trademarks, the 
Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2039, 2049 (2009) 
(positing that "[u)nder the U.S. Constitution, the legitimacy of the enactment of patent and 
copyright law depends on the social (or, if you prefer, political) equation of 'Progress,' the 
constitutional standard, with the knowledge that the patent system supports."). 
132. See Crane, supra note 125, at 101 ("The framers of the Constitution, familiar with the 
limited patent, copyright, and trademark privilege system of England, altered the English practice 
to better reflect the new nation's pioneering spirit."); J. Wesley Cochran, It Takes Two to Tango!: 
Problems with Community Property Ownership ofCopyrights and Patents in Texas, 58 BAYLOR 
L. REv. 407, 425 (2006) (stating that "President Washington urged Congress to enact legislation 
to protect copyrights and patents to encourage creative efforts in the new nation, and Congress 
responded with the passage ofthe first national patent and copyright statutes"). 
133. See Trade-Mark Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 79, 16 Stat. 198; Trade-Mark Act of 1881, ch. 
138, § 7, 21 Stat. 502. The Trade-Mark Act of 1870 was "[a)n Act to revise, consolidate, and 
amend the Statutes relating to Patents and Copyrights," and Congress relied on the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, to enact trademark provisions. Trade-Mark Act of 
1870, at 198. Subsequently, the Supreme Court declared that Congress lacked constitutional 
power to regulate trademarks under the Patent and Copyright Clause. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 
U.S. 82, 99 (1879). Thereafter, Congress used the Commerce Clause and passed federal 
trademark statutes. 
134. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et 
du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing that 
"'commerce' under the [Lanham) Act is coterminous with that commerce that Congress may 
regulate under the Commerce Oause of the United States Constitution"); Irina D. Manta, 
Privatizing Trademarks, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 381, 382 (2009) (restating that the Commerce Clause 
provides the Constitutional basis for Congress to pass federal trademark law). 
135. See Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies: Reconceptualizing 
Property in Databases, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 819 (2003) (observing that the 1996 
federal statute does not pre-empt state trade secret law). 
136. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (stating that the patent term is 20 years from an 
effective filing date); see also David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wolman, Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust: General Principles, 43 IDEA 395, 473 (2003) (posing a question between the legal life 
ofa patent, which is 20 years from the date of filing the patent application, and the economic life 
ofa patent). The current legal life ofa patent represents a change from seventeen years to twenty 
years. See C. Michael White , Why a Seventeen Year Patent?, 38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 839, 840 
(1956) ("Ideally the legal life of a patent should represent a balance between the additional 
incentive ofanother year and the social cost of a longer monopoly."). 
137. See Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a Functional Definition ofPublication in Copyright Law, 
92 MrnN. L. REv. 1724, 1732-34 (2008) (reviewing the statutory provision for the legal life of 
copyright created by natural authors and works made for hire). 
138. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (providing that the copyright term is life of the natural author 
plus 70 years; but the work for hire duration is the earlier of 95 years from publication or 120 
years from creation); Deborall Tussey, What IfEmployees Owned Their Copyrights?, 2008 MlcH. 
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legal hfe lasts as long as the trademark 1s used m commerce to identify a 
partlcular source and to d1stmgmsh the trademarked products 139 That means 
the life of a trademark can be one year, ten years, or one hundred years. A 
trade secret lasts as long as the secret is kept a secret. The trade secret ceases 
to have a legal life if the public learns it, causing the trade secret to lose its 
independent economic value; 140 thus the life of a trade secret is 
indeterminable. 141 
Both patents and copyrights are grants wherein the federal government 
passes law that specifically recognizes exclusive rights for a limited time. 142 
For trademarks, both federal and state laws recognize and extend protection. 143 
The Lanham Act of 1946 is the authoritative federal source for trademark 
protection. 144 States also have trademark laws to regulate, within state 
boundaries, trademarks and competitive conduct related to trademarks. 145 
There is no comprehensive federal trade secret statute akin to the federal 
1% . 1~
trademark statute; each state has 1ts own trade secret laws to regulate. 
ST. L. REv. 233, 234 n.6 (2008) (discussing works made for hire duration). 
139. See Mark Bartholomew & Jolm Tehranian, The Secret Lifo of Legal Doctrine: The 
Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1363, 1400 (2006) (stating that trademarks are different from copyrights because the 
term ofprotection is ''potentially infinite" due to the duration ofuse by their owners). 
140. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (noting that "[b]ecause of 
the intangible nature of a trade secret, the extent of the property right therein is defined by the 
extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to others"); Sean D. 
Whaley, "''m a Highway Star": An Outline for a Federal Right of Publicity, 31 HASTINGS 
CoMM. & ENT L.J. 257, 272 (2009) (discussing that copyrights and patents enjoy fixed duration 
of protection, but trademarks and trade secrets may be valid "in perpetuity as long as certain 
criteria are met"). 
141. See Stephen I. Willis, An Economic Evaluation ofTrade Secrets, 269 PLI/ Pat 737, 752­
53 (1989) (emphasizing that the owner of a trade secret can collect royalties from a license 
indefinitely). 
142. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932) ("A copyright, like a patent, is 
'at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations 
and skill of individuals and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects."') 
(internal citations omitted). 
143. See Kathryn M. Foley, Protecting Fictional Characters: Defining the Elusive 
Trademark-Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REv. 921, 939-40 (2009) (discussing federal and 
state protections for trademarks). 
144. See id; Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End ofTrademark Law, 65 WASH. 
& LEE L. REv. 585, 595--DOO (2008) (reviewing the history of the Lanham Act and expansion of 
trademark protection). 
145. See Jasmine Abdel-khalik, Is a Rose by Any Other Image Still a Rose? Disconnecting 
Dilution's Similarity Test from Traditional Trademark Concepts, 39 U. ToL. L. REv. 591, 598-99 
(2008) (noting state trademark protection against dilutive use and how Congress joined states in 
enacting the federal Trademark Dilution statute in 1995); Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 
BROOK. L. REv. 1327, 1361 (2008) (stating that "in the United States, the federal Lanham Act is 
the primary source of trademark protection, though state common law and statutory protections 
are also available"). 
146. See generally Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets in Anglo­
American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RlcH. L. REv. 313 (1997); Christopher Rebel J. Pace, 
The Case fora Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. &TECH. 427,442 (1995). 
147. See Preseaultv. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (noting that "state 
law creates property right in trade secrets for purposes ofFifth Amendment, and regulatory regime 
does not pre-empt state property law"); see also Julie Piper, Comment, I Have A Secret?: 
Applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to Confidential Information that Does Not Rise to the 
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Most states adopt all or parts of the model trade secret statute to recogmze 
trade secrets and define what conduct constitutes misappropriation of a trade 
secret. 148 Nonetheless, trade secrets are deemed to have more traditional 
characteristics of property than the other types of intellectual property. 149 
In developing various tests for analyzing intellectual property transactions, 
courts had to reconcile the substantive similarities and differences among the 
different types of intellectual property. In some contexts, tax cases emphasized 
the substantive similarities among the forms (e.g., grants of monopolies) and 
applied the case law that developed relating to one type of intellectual property 
to other types. 15° For example, as described above, early case law established 
that in order for a transfer of a patent to constitute a sale for tax purposes, all 
substantial rights had to be transferred, and that sale treatment could result 
even though the consideration received by the transferor was measured by 
production, use, or sale of the patented article. 151 Several courts later used this 
framework in determining whether or not the transfer of a copyrifht, trade 
secret, trademark, or trade name constituted a sale for tax purposes. 15 
When confronted with whether a copyright assignment could be denied sale 
treatment solely because the purchase price took the form of contingent 
payments, the Service relied on its previous position with respect to contingent 
payments in patent assignments: "Since the property rights of patents and 
copyrights are similar in substance, it is concluded that the Service should 
adopt, in the case of copyrights, the position that is being taken in the case of 
patents." 153 
In analyzing whether or not the transfer of a trade secret meets the sale 
requirement, a number of courts applied the tests that had been used in 
analyzing patent assignments based on the valid and important similarities 
between a patent and a trade secret. 154 While a patent is different from a trade 
Level ofTrade Secret Status, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PRoP. L. REv. 359, 360 (2008) (discussing the 
history ofstate trade secret law against misappropriation). 
148. See generally Michael J. Hutte1, The Case for Adoption ofa Unifonn Trade Secrets Act 
in New York, 10 ALB. L.J. Scr. & TEcH. 1, 6-9 (1999) (arguing for New York to depart from 
following the Restatement approach to trade secret misappropriation and adopt legislation 
modeled afte1 the Uniform Trade Secrets Act); Breana C. Smith et al., Intellectual Property 
Crimes, 43 AM. CR1M. L. REv. 663, 679 (2006) (emphasizing the criminal and civil laws 
available at the state level against trade secret thefts). 
149. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that trade secrets, 
despite their intangible nature, are property rights ''protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment"). For more ''takings" analysis oftrade secrets, see Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 
F.3d 24, 30-47 (1st Cir. 2002) (en bane) (holding that state requirement ofdisclosure of cigarette 
content was a regulatory taking oftrade secrets); DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 
14 (Cal. 2003) (stating that trade secrets represent "a constitutionally recognized property interest 
in information"). 
150. For substantive similarities, see supra notes 109-30 and accompanying text. 
151. Id. 
152. See, e.g., Leisure Dynamics, Inc. v. Comm'r, 494 F.2d 1340, 1340 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(applying framework to trademarks and trade names); Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162, 165 
(3d Cir. 1958) (copyrights); Stalke1 Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Mich. 1962) 
(trade secrets). 
153. Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26. 
154. See, e.g., Pickren v . United States, 378 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1967) (''Secret formulas 
129 
NGUYENMAINE W KG 6 / 14 /2011 8:37AM 
20 11] The History ofIntellectual Property Taxation 
secret (an essential element of the latter is the right in the discoverer to prevent 
unauthorized disclosure), an important similarity is that "[t]he value in both 
lies in the rights they give to their owners for monopolistic exploitation. "155 A 
patent transfer meets the sale requirement only if the transferor transfers all 
substantial rights (e.g. , the right to prevent others from operating under the 
patent). 156 By analogy, the transfer of a trade secret constitutes a sale only if 
the transferor conveys his or her most important rights-"the right to prevent 
unauthorized disclosure and the right to prevent further use of the trade secret 
by all others." 157 
In analyzing the tax treatment of transfers of trademarks and trade names , 
some courts relied on the tax law that had developed on patent transfers, 
although such analogies were a bit less helpful. 158 If a patent transfer was 
considered a sale only if the transferor relinquished all substantial rights, then 
it would make sense that a trademark transfer should be considered a sale only 
if the transferor did not retain significant rights or continuing interests with 
respect to the transferred trademark. But what sorts of retained continuing 
interests should preclude sale treatment? In a typical trademark or trade name 
transfer, it is not uncommon for a variety of conditions to be included in the 
transfer agreement. The transferor may retain, for example, certain powers, 
rights, or continuing interests in order to maintain some operational control of 
the trademark or trade name (e.g., continuing to participate in employee 
training or conducting advertising promotions). Without any clear rules, and 
with only general analogies to patent cases, early disputes arose between the 
Service and transferors of trademarks and trade names over the tax 
implications of such retained powers, rights, or continuing interests; numerous 
courts were called upon to ascertain when varying conditions in trademark and 
trade name agreements were significant enough to preclude sale treatment. 
Some of the early cases dealing with the problem of differentiating a sale from 
and trade names are sufficiently akin to patents to war1ant the application, by analogy, ofilie tax 
law that has been developed relating to the transfer of patent rights, in tax cases involving 
transfers ofsecret formulas and trade names."); E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 
288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Stalker Cop., 209 F. Supp. at 33 ("\Vhether or not the transfer 
of a trade secret constitutes a sale for tax purposes, the tests used in determining whether or not 
there has been a sale ofa patent have been applied."). 
155. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 288 F.2d at 911 ('"The owner of a patent can make 
something which no one else can make because no one else is permitted. But circumstances are 
frequently such that the owner of a trade secret can make someiliing which no one else can make 
because no one else knows how. The patent owner has a monopoly created by law; the trade 
secret owner has a monopoly in fact. In boili cases there exists the possibility ofeiilier limited or 
complete transfers ofilie right to the exclusive use ofan idea."). 
156. See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Scientific Research v . Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
157. Stalker Cop., 209 F. Supp. at 34 (stating "[a] transfer of anything less results in a 
transaction which is not a sale under the Code"). 
158. See Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 856, 870-72 (1946), aff'dper 
curiam, 165 F.2d 216 (9ili Cir. 1948) (relying on patent cases in analyzing a trade name transfer); 
see also Herwig v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384, 388 (Ct. Cl. 1952) ("Since ilie basic nature of 
copyrights, patents and trademarks is the same, i.e., grants of monopolies for a fixed period of 
time by the Government as a reward for the particular genius of the one receiving the grant, it 
would seem that the rights granted in connection with any one ofthem should be treated the same 
under the law.'). 
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a license involved the transfer of Daifl Queen franchises by territorial 
15franchisors to individual subfranchisees. It was not uncommon for courts to 
160
reach different results on virtually identical facts. 
At issue in many of the trademark and trade name cases was the effect, if 
any, of the contingent payment arrangement. As with patent and copyright 
transfers, transfers of trademarks and trade names frequently involve payments 
made by the transferee that are payable over a period of time and are 
contingent on production. The question was whether the contingent payment 
arrangement was inconsistent with the characteristics of a sale. As noted 
earlier in this Article, the Service was quick to resolve the issue in patent and 
copyright cases-the form of payment should not influence the decision as to 
whether a ~atent or copyright assignment is treated as a sale or license for tax 
purposes. 1 1 The Service did not employ the same position in trademark and 
trade name cases, viewing the receipt of contingent payments as a continuing 
economic interest similar to the receipt of royalty income. There was much 
diversity of opinion among courts over the issue. The form of payment 
influenced some courts to treat the transaction as if it were a license, with the 
162
result that the payments were taxable as ordinary income. Some other 
courts did not regard the form of payment to be controlling, with the result that 
payments received capital gain treatment. 163 Courts struggled with such 
questions as the following: Should contingent payment arrangements be 
analyzed apart from the other conditions in the agreement? Does it matter 
whether or not the payments were the only form of monetary consideration? 
Does it matter whether the transfer agreement was perpetual or not? Analogies 
in trademark and trade name cases to patent cases provided little guidance, 
highlighting the need for specific tax rules governing trademarks and trade 
name assets. 
Courts did not always find all types of intellectual property sufficiently 
similar to one another to warrant providing them similar treatment under the 
tax laws. In considering the deductibility of attorney's fees and other litigation 
costs incurred in the pursuit and settlement of intellectual property 
159. See Consol. Foods Corp. v. United States, 569 F.2d 436, 438-40 (7th Cir. 1978). 
160. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits held that transfers were not sales for tax purposes because 
of the rights, powers, and continuing interests retained by the transferor. See United States v. 
Wementin, 354 F.2d 757, 766 (8th Cir. 1965) (as to both lump sum and contingent payments); 
Moberg v. Comm'r, 310 F.2d 782, 783~84 (9th Cir. 1962) (as to three of the four forms of 
agreement at issue). However, the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits-in similar transactions­
found sales to exist and allowed capital gain treatment. See Moberg v. Comm'r, 305 F.2d 800, 
806 (5th Cir. 1962) (as to lump sum payments but not contingent payments); Estate ofGowdey v. 
Comm'r, 307 F.2d 816, 818 (4th Cir. 1962) (as to lump sum payment but not contingent 
payments); Dairy Queen ofOkla., Inc. v. Comm'r, 250 F.2d 503, 506 (lOth Cir. 1957) (as to both 
lump sum payment and contingent payments). For a good summary of these cases, see Consol. 
Foods Cop. , 569 F.2d at 438-40. See also John H. Hall, Tax Aspects ofFranchising Operations, 
in TWENTIETH ANNUAL TULANE TAX lNSTifUTE 102, 111~13 (1971); RichardT. Husseman & 
Robert D. Kaplan, Comment, Federal Taxation ofFranchise Sales, 44 WASH. L. REv. 617, 619~ 
25 (1969). 
161. See supra notes 66~70, 153 and accompanying text. 
162. See, e.g, Moberg, 305 F.2d at 338, 340; Estate ofGowdey, 307 F.2d at 818. 
163. See, e.g, Moberg, 310 F.2d at 784; Dairy Queen ofOkla. , Inc., 250 F.2d at 506. 
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infringement actions, courts focused on the substantive differences among the 
intellectual property forms in creating tax distinctions. Under general tax 
principles, legal fees incurred in a business or profit-seeking context (e.g., 
those related to the production or collection of taxable income) are deductible 
unless they are considered capital expenditures. 164 Regulations provide 
examples of nondeductible capital expenditures including the cost of acquiring 
property with a "useful life substantially beyond the taxable year" and "[t]he 
cost of defending or perfecting title to property." 165 Accordingly, attorney's 
fees in a suit to quiet title to land are not deductible, but attorney's fees in a 
suit to collect accrued rents on the land are deductible. 166 To determine 
whether litigation costs-even if incurred in a business or profit-seeking 
activity-are nondeductible capital expenditures, courts focus on the claim's 
origin and character with respect to which the litigation costs are incurred. 167 
The "origin of the claim" test is not a purely mechanical test; it requires more 
than focusing merely on the taxpayer' s intent in filing the suit. 168 One must 
also consider "the issues involved, the nature and objectives of the litigation, 
the defenses asserted, the purpose for which the claimed deductions were 
expended, the background of the litigation, and all facts pertaining to the 
,169
controversy. 
Using this framework to determine the deductibility or capitalization of 
intellectual property litigation costs was not an easy task for courts. Should all 
intellectual property litigation (e.g., patent infringement, copyright 
infringement, and trademark infringement actions) be viewed the same for tax 
purposes? If the issues involved, the objectives of the litigation, and the 
defenses asserted in each are similar, then a standard based on the origin of the 
claim litigated would dictate similar tax treatment of legal costs incurred 
therein. "While viewing all such intellectual property litigation 
generically" has "the unarguable appeal of expediency," it "also ignores the 
actual inherent differences and purposes of the various rights and remedies 
involved. " 170 Over time, tax courts struggled to identifY and reconcile the 
164. See I.R.C. § 162 (2000) (allowing a deduction for ordinary and necessary business 
expenses paid or incurred during 1he year in carrying on any trade or business); id § 212 
(allowing a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during 1he year for the 
production or collection of income and for the management, conversation, or maintenance of 
property held for 1he production of income). But see id § 263 (providing 1hat no deduction shall 
be allowed for capital expenditures). 
165. Treas. Reg.§ 1.263(a)-2(a), (c) (as amended in 1987). 
166. Treas. Reg.§ 1.212-l(k) (as amended in 1975). 
167. The "origin of 1he claim" test was originally created by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963), and used to determine whe1her litigation costs were 
incurred in a business or profit-seeking context or whether the costs were personal. The origin of 
the claim standard has also been used to determine whe1her li ligation costs--even ifincurred in a 
business or profit-seeking activity~are nondeductible capital expenditures. Woodward v. 
Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572, 578-79 (1970) (holding 1hat the origin of1he claim 1hat gave rise to the 
legal fees was 1he acquisition of stock, and thus, the fees should be capitalized). 
168. See Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 7 13 (1973), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 1. 
169. !d. The origin of 1he claim test has been used in a number oflower court cases. See, 
e.g , Madden v. Comm'r, 514 F.2d 1149, 1151-52 (91h Cir. 1975); Fleischman v. Comm'r, 45 
T.C. 439, 444-47 (1966). 
170. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 199925012 (June 25, 1999), available at 1999 WL 
NGUYENMAINE W KG 6 / 14/2011 8:37AM 
132 SMU LAWREVIEW [Vol. 64 
distinguishing characteristics of intellectual property when determining the 
proper tax treatment of intellectual property litigation costs. In infringement 
cases, courts generally concluded that legal fees incurred in patent 
infringement actions were deductible. 171 In contrast, legal fees incurred in 
trademark infringement actions were not deductible but had to be 
172
capitalized. The apparent distinction was that in patent and copyright 
infringement cases, litigation costs are incurred to recover lost profits and 
damages and not to remove cloud of title or defend ownership of property 1 73 
In trademark and trade name infringement cases, litigation costs "resemble the 
cost of perfecting or preserving title to property, a cost well established as 
. 1 d.cap1ta expen 1tures. ,174 
C. ESTABLISHING SIGNIFICANCE OF TANGIBLE MEDIUM EMBODYING 

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 

As described earlier, the traditional forms of intellectual property-patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets-generally depend on tangible forms 
175 for their creative existence. For example, the patent for a drug needs the 
actual pills to carry out the potent effects claimed by the patent owner and the 
copyright for an author's novel requires either a book, CD, or other tangible 
medium embodying the words of the novel. Though we cannot see, touch, or 
feel patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets, they are everywhere and 
exist wherever the tangible or digital forms embodying them are transported 
and in existence. They can be easily duplicated, multiplied, and distributed 
worldwide. 
Because intellectual property depends on tangible forms for its creative 
existence, an important tax issue is whether tangible medium embodying 
intellectual property should be significant in determining the tax treatment of 
intellectual property. The government has not always taken a consistent 
approach. 
In determining the tax consequences of certain intellectual property 
transactions, the government has largely ignored the legal attributes of 
intellectual property, instead deeming significant the tangible medium 
embodying the intellectual property. An example in which the tax treatment of 
a transaction depends on the tangible medium embodying intellectual property 
424839. 
171. See, e.g , Urquhartv. Comm'r, 215 F.2d 17, 120 (3d Cir. 1954). 
172. See, e.g., Medco Prods. Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 523 F.2d 137, 139 (lOth Cir. 1975); 
Danskin, Inc. v. Comm'r, 331 F.2d 360, 361--62 (2d Cir. 1964). But see J.R. Wood & Sons, Inc. 
v. Comm'r, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1038 (1962) (holding costs ofunsuccessful trademark infringement 
currently deductible). 
173. Litigation costs in patent infungement actions are deductible even though the defense of 
invalidity ofpatent claims is normally raised and disposed offirst. See Urquhart, 215 F.2d at 20-­
21. 
174. Danskin, Inc., 331 F.2d. at 361 ('The purpose and effect of the legal expenses ... was to 
increase the value of taxpayer's registered trademark and to make more secure taxpayer's 
property in it by forever eliminating the possibility of having it impaired by the competitive use 
of this confusingly similar mark."). 
1 7 5. See supra notes 112- 16 and accompanying text. 
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involves the exchange of intellectual property. As a general rule, the exchange 
of one type of intellectual property for a different type of intellectual property 
is a realization event potentially subject to taxation with the amount of gain 
equal to the difference between the value of the intellectual property received 
and the adjusted basis of the intellectual property given in the exchange. 176 
However a special nonrecognition rules applies to "like kind" exchanges of 
177property. Specifically, no gain need be recognized if business or 
investment property is exchanged sole~ for property of a "like kind" to be held 
for use in business or investment. 17 Under the approach adopted by the 
Treasury, whether intellectual property is of a like kind to other intellectual 
property depends not only on "the nature or character of the [intangible] rights 
involved (e.g., a patent or a copyright), [but] also on the nature or character of 
the underlying {tangible asset] to which the {intellectual] property relates." 179 
Accordingly, if a taxpayer "exchanges a copyright on a novel for a copyri?ht 
on a different novel," then "[t]he properties exchanged are of a like kind." 80 
On the other hand, if a taxpayer exchanges a copyright on a novel for a 
copyriftht on a song," then "[t]he properties exchanged are not of a like 
1kind. " 
A second example is the tax treatment of software development costs. One 
approach to software development costs would be to prescribe different tax 
treatments depending on the protection sought (e.g. , patent, copyright, trade 
secret). In other words, if developed software were protected as a patent, then 
the development costs would be treated the same as costs of developing any 
patentable invention. If, on the other hand, the software were protected only as 
a copyright, then the development costs would be treated the same as costs of 
developing any copyright (e.g., copyrighted novel, copyrighted song). Without 
clear rules, the Service adopted a different approach-one that ignores the 
form of intangible intellectual protection sought and instead focuses on the 
subject of protection. 182 Under a longstanding administrative ruling, software 
development costs are treated the same (i.e., currently deductible) regardless of 
whether the software is patented, copyrighted, or protected by trade secret. 183 
A third example is the tax treatment of advertising expenditures that produce 
intellectual property rights of a long-term nature (e.g., graphic designs, 
package designs). As a general rule, the government allows taxpayers to 
currently deduct advertising costs notwithstanding the fact that advertisi~ 
often produces benefits that continue well beyond the current taxable year. 1 
176. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006) (providing 1he amonnt of gain is the excess of the amonnt 
realized over 1he adjusted basis of1he property transferred). 
177. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2006). 
178. !d. 
179. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1031(a)-2(c)(as amendedin2005). 
180. !d. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(3), Ex. 1. 
181. !d. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(3), Ex. 2. 
182. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, superseded and updated by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 
2000-2 C.B. 601. 
183. !d. 
184. After the Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 
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"Only in the unusual circumstance where advertising 1s directed towards 
obtaining future benefits significantly beyond those traditionally associated 
with ordinary [product, institutional,] or goodwill advertising, must the costs . 
. be capitalized." 185 Advertising expenditures often create intellectual 
property rights in trademarks and trade dress (the total image and overall 
appearance of a product), as such rights are based on use in commerce and 
often encompass the costs of creating copyrightable advertising materials. An 
interesting question is whether these long-term intangible benefits should serve 
as the basis for requiring capitalization of advertising campaign expenditures. 
Or, should such costs be deductible because they resulted from advertising 
activities? 
In one case, 186 a tax court allowed trade dress and copyright development 
costs to be deducted even though such costs in a non-advertising context would 
most likely have to be capitalized. The taxpayer incurred substantial costs in 
developing an advertising campaign-namely expenses relating to the creation 
of graphic designs and package designs for the packagin9 of its cigarette 
products-and sought to deduct such campaign expenditures. 87 The taxpayer 
also sought to deduct the costs of executing the campaign. 188 Although the 
government conceded that the advertising execution expenses were deductible, 
it argued that the advertising campaign expenditures should be capitalized. 
The government's argument was that the campaign expenditures provided 
long-term benefits that were not traditionally associated with ordinary business 
advertising. The graphic design and package design costs provided legal rights 
and economic interests of a long-term nature-the legal rights being the 
statutory rights and common-law trademark rights that attach to trade dress and 
the economic interest being the associated brand equity. 189 In addition, the 
taxpayer received lon~-term copyright protection for its copyrightable 
advertising materials. 19 The court rejected the government's argument and 
held that graphic and package design costs incurred by the taxpayer were not 
required to be capitalized but were deductible as ordinary product 
. . 191 
advertlsmg. 
(1992), current deductibility of advertising costs was nncertain because most adveltising gives 
rise to long-term benefits. In Revenue Ruling 92-80, however, the Service ruled that INDOPCO, 
Inc. "[would] not affect the treatment of advertising costs as business expenses which are 
generally deductible nnder section 162 ofthe Code." Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57. 
185. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57. 
186. RJR Nabisco Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1988), action on dec., 1999-012 
(Oct. 4, 1999). 
187. "A 'graphic design' ... is a combination of verbal information, styles ofprint, pictures 
or drawings, shapes, patterns, colors, spacing, and the like that make up an overall visual display. 
The term 'package design' ... refers to the design of the physical construction of the package." 
Id at 73. 
188. Adveltising execution expenditures were defined by the Service as costs of executing the 
adveltising campaign (e.g., costs ofproduction oftelevision commercials). Id 
189. Id at 83. 
190. Id at 84. 
191. Id at 84-85. In a 1999 action on decision, the Service did not acquiesce to the court's 
decision in RJR Nahisco Inc. and annonnced that it would continue to litigate the treatment of 
package design costs where appropriate. Id, action on dec., 1999-012 (Oct. 4, 1999) ("Rev. Rul 
NGUYENMAINE W KG 	 6 / 14 /2011 8:37AM 
20 11] The History ofIntellectual Property Taxation 135 
In the vast majority of cases, the nature of the developed intangible benefits 
and the length of legal protections are significant in determining tax results. 
However, such legal attributes have been rendered completely irrelevant in 
certain contexts. As demonstrated here, a company must generally capitalize 
copyright development costs, but it does not have to capitalize costs if the 
subject of the copyright is software or if the copyright is the product of 
advertising activities. Relying on intellectual property attributes in some 
contexts and disregarding them in others creates incoherent distinctions in tax 
law. 
IV. 	 THREE GOALS OF SPECIFIC TAX RULES GOVERNING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Congress began enacting intellectual property tax rules in the 1950s. As a 
result of tax legislation over the past five decades, the Code now contains 
several special rules that govern different types of intellectual property. A few 
of the s~ecial provisions apply equally to a large group of intellectual property 
assets. 1 2 Most, however, are mutually exclusive, gov erning specific forms of 
intellectual property. 193 In applying these rules, it is helpful to understand as 
much as possible about why they exist and how they fit into or conflict with 
sound policy. Here, each ofthe special rules is described in terms of its stated 
policy objectives. While a few of the provisions were designed to encourage 
certain intellectual property activities, the vast majority of the special rules 
were enacted on an ad hoc basis with particular tax goals in mind: (1) to close 
tax loopholes and remove tax inequities, or (2) to simplifY rules and eliminate 
tax uncertainties that existed under general tax principles. 
A SUPPORTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
1. Tax Incentives for Patent Development Activities 
In a few cases, special legislation was designed to support intellectual 
property growth and incentivize desirable intellectual property activity. In 
1954, Congress enacted two provisions primarily to encourage research 
activity and to stimulate economic growth and technological development. 194 
92-80 should not be read as a concession that package design costs are advertising and, therefore, 
deductible."). For the Service's position, see Rev. Proc. 2002-9, 2002-3 I.R.B. 327 (app. 3.01); 
Rev. Proc. 97-35, 1997-2 C.B. 448; Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85. In 2004, the 
Treasury Department issued regulations permitting a deduction for the costs of creating package 
designs. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(3)(v) (2004) (providing that an amount paid to create a 
package design is not treated as an amount that creates a separate and distinct intangible asset). It 
should be noted that although a taxpayer can deduct the costs ofdeveloping a package design, the 
taxpayer must capitalize the costs of obtaining trademarks and copyrights on elements of the 
package design (i.e., the fees paid to a government agency to obtain trademark and copyright 
protection on certain elements ofthe package design). Id § 1.263(a)-4(1), Ex. 9(i). 
192. See, e.g, I.R.C. §§ 167(g)(6), 170(e)(l)(B)(iii), 170(m), 197(d)(l) (2006). 
193. See, e.g , id §§ 41, 167(f)(l), 167(g)(8), 174, 1221(a)(3), 1221(b)(3), 1235, 1253. 
194. Id § 174(a) (1954) (allowing taxpayers to treat research or experimental expenditures as 
expenses not chargeable to capital account as long as those expenditures are paid or incurred in 
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Section 174 of the Code permits taxpayers to deduct immediately certain 
research and development expenditures that might otherwise have to be 
capitalized. 195 Section 1235 provides statutory assurance to certain individual 
inventors that the sale of their patents will qualify for reduced capital gain 
rates. 196 More specifically, the special rule guarantees capital gain rates, as 
opposed to higher ordinary income tax rates, for any transfer of all substantial 
rights to a patent by certain holders to umelated parties. 197 Working together, 
these two rules permit an inventor to deduct research costs when incurred and 
then enjoy a low capital gains tax on the later sale ofthe resulting invention. 198 
To encourage firms to actually increase their research expenditures over 
time, Congress enacted a special credit. 199 The credit currently found in 
section 41 of the Code is incremental in that it is equal to a certain percentage 
of qualified research spending above a base amount, which can be thought of 
as a firm's normal level of research and development investment200 The credit 
connection wi1h 1he taxpayer's trade or business); id § 263(a)(l)(B) (providing that the 
capitalization rules under section 263(a) do not apply to research or experimental expenditures 
deductible under section 174(a)). 
195. Id; see H.R. REP. No. 1337 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 401 7, 4053; 100 
CoNG. REc. 3,425 (1954) (statement of Chairman Reed: "This provision will greatly stimulate the 
search for new products and new inventions upon which 1he future economic and military 
streng1h of our Nation depends. It will be particularly valuable to small and growing 
businesses."); see also Alexander, supra note 22, at 549 (noting a primary reason for enacting 
section 17 4 was to create an incentive for new products and inventions through federal subsidy of 
research and development start-ups); William Natbony, The Tax Incentives for Research and 
Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEo. L.J. 347, 349 (1987) (explaining 1hat 
Congress decided to provide taxpayers wi1h the option of an immediate deduction in order to 
encourage new research and development); Richard L. Parker, The Innocent Civilians in the War 
against NOL Trafficking: Section 382 andHigh-Tech Start-Up Companies, 9 VA. TAX REv. 625, 
694 (1990) ("The deduction election under section 174(a) is intended to encourage research and 
development activities by allowing 1he cost of such activities to be used to offset 1he income 
earned in the business at the earliest possible date.'). 
196. I.R.C. § 1235 (2010); seeS. REP. No. 83-1622, at 439 (1954), reprinted in 1954 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082 (stating a policy goal underlying section 1235 ' s enactment was "to 
provide an incentive to inventors to contribute to the welfare of1he Nation"). 
197. I.R.C. § 1235. 
198. A related incentive for inventors is 1he exemption from the general ''recapture" rules of 
section 1245. I.R.C. § 1245 (2006). Under section 1245, any gain recognized on 1he disposition 
of intangible personal property must be reported as ordinary income-not capital gain-to the 
extent of any deductions (e.g., depreciation and amortization) taken wi1h respect to 1he property. 
Id § 1245(a)(l). In oilier words, any part of 1he gain that is attributable to depreciation or 
amortization deductions previously attributable to 1he transferred property must be recaptured as 
ordinary income and taxed at ordinary rates, whereas any part of 1he gain that is attributable to 
economic appreciation may be taxed at capital gains rates. See id Al1hough intangible personal 
property is generally subject to recapture, Newton Insert Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 570, 587 
(1974), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1259 (91h Cir. 1976), 1he government has clarified in an administrative 
pronouncement 1hat inventions, 1he creation costs ofwhich were expensed under section 174, are 
not subject to section 1245 recapture, Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84 (providing 1hat section 
17 4(a) deductions need not be recaptured as ordinary income on later sale). Thus, the entire 
amount of gain recognized by an inventor on a later sale--gain attributable to research and 
experimental costs expensed under section 17 4, as well as gain attributable to true economic 
appreciation in value of 1he invention-may receive preferential capital gains treatment under 
section 1235. 
199. Id Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a), 95 Stat. 172, 241 
(1981) (establishing original research credit at I.R.C. § 44F (1981)). 
200. The credit is 20% ofqualified research expenditures in excess of a base amount 1hat is a 
137 
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is temporary and has been extended more than a dozen times since its 
enactment in 1981. 
These three tax provisions, sections 41 , 174, and 1235, clearly reflect a 
policy decision to incentivize the development of patents and patent-like 
property. Trade secrets and know-how that have potential for patentability 
should fall within the scope of these incentives. Section 174 regulations define 
deductible research and experimental expenditures broadly to include all costs 
incident to product development or improvement, which includes "any pilot 
C' 1 . . h . . .1 ,201rnad 1 e, process, 10rmu a, mventwn, tee mque, patent, or s1m1 ar property. 
Section 1235 regulations provide that no patent or patent application need be 
currently in existence, suggesting that an inventor can receive capital gain 
treatment for patentable, or patent-like, property. 202 
2. Tax Rules Applicable to Other Intellectual Property Development Activities 
The three tax incentives for patents and patent-like property do not apply to 
other forms of intellectual property, such as copyrights and trademarks. 20 3 
While costs of developing these types of intellectual property must generally 
be capitalized, 204 several exceptions have been carved out. 
One exception from the capitalization requirement can be found in section 
263A(h). That special provision, enacted in 1988, permits certain freelance 
writers, photographers, and artists to deduct "gualified creative expenses" that 
would otherwise have to be capitalized. 205 The stated purpose of the 
exception was not to promote freelance activities but rather to relieve writers, 
photographers, and artists from the burden of the capitalization rules, 
especially when their activities may not generate income for years. 206 
A second exception from capitalization pertains to advertising expenditures 
that result in trademark and copyright protections. As discussed earlier, such 
"fixed-base percentage" of the taxpayer's average annual gross receipts for the four preceding tax 
years. For established finns, the fixed-base percentage is generally based on a ratio of the 
taxpayer's qualified research expenses to its gross receipts for years 1984 to 1988, capped at 16%. 
For start-up firms, the fixed-base percentage is set at 3% during the finn's first five tax years with 
spending on qualified research and gross receipts. In no event shall the base amount be less than 
50% of the qualified research expenses for the credit year. 
201. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1 74-2(a)(1H2) (as amended in 1994). 
202. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a) (1957); see Gilson v. Comm'r, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 922 (1984) 
(allowing patent tax treatment even though only two of eight designs were patented). 
203. See Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(3) (1960) (prohibiting deduction of expenditures for 
"literary, historical, or similar projects"); S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 439-40 (1954), reprinted in 
1954 U .S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082. 
204. I.R.C. § 263A (2006) (requiring capitalization of expenditures in connection with 
copyrightable subject matter); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b) (2004) (requiring capitalization of 
costs of obtaining rights from a governmental agency, as well as costs of creating any "separate 
and distinct intangible asset"). 
205. I.R.C. § 263A(h), enacted as part of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6026, 102 Stat. 3342, 3691 - 92 (1988). A qualified creative 
expense is defrned as any expense "paid or incurred by an individual in the trade or business of . 
. being a writer, photographer, or artist," which, except for the uniform capitalization rules of 
section 263A, would be otherwise deductible for the taxable year. I.R.C. § 263A(h)(2)(A). 
206. See H.R. REP. No. 100-1104, at 145 (1988) (Conf Rep.), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5205. 
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costs are currently deductible as general advertising even though such costs 
provide benefits of a long-term nature. 207 
A third exception from the capitalization requirement pertains to software 
development costs. Also discussed earlier, such costs are currently deductible 
regardless of the type of intellectual property protection on the software. 208 It 
should be noted that although these exceptions permit certain taxpayers to 
deduct actual creation and development costs (e.g., costs of writing a book, 
costs of developing a package design, costs of developing software), taxpayers 
are required to capitalize fees paid to any government a~ency to obtain 
trademark and copyright protections on the developed product. 09 
B. ELIMINATING LOOPHOLES AND REMOVING TAX INEQUITIES 
1. Tax Rules Governing Copyright Sales 
On several occasions, Congress has enacted provisions to close loopholes or 
remove tax inequities that existed under general tax rules. In the earliest 
example, in 1950, Congress enacted section 1221(a)(3) of the Code to close a 
loophole with respect to capital gain treatment on certain copyright sales. 210 
Prior to the enactment of section 1221 (a )(3 ), the tax treatment of a sale of a 
copyright depended on the professional status of the writer, author, or 
photographer. For example, if the author of a book was a professional writer, 
the sale of the copyright for the book resulted in ordinary income because 
inventory is not considered a "capital asset," a requirement for capital gain 
treatment211 If the author was an amateur, however, the book was considered 
a capital asset, and the sale resulted in capital gain. To remove the loophole 
and provide uniform ordinary income treatment for the sale of self-created 
property, Congress added section 1221(a)(3) to exclude from the capital asset 
definition a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, or similar 
property held by the creator. 212 This exclusion created a level playing field for 
professional and amateur copyright creators alike. It was also consistent with 
the idea of taxing wages and salaries as ordinary income. 
Ironically, the 1950 law, which was designed to treat all copyright creators 
207. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text. 
208. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. 
209. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(l)(ii), (d)(5), (/), Ex. 9 (requiring capitalization of costs of 
obtaining certain rights from a governmental agency). 
210. See Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 210, 64 Stat. 906, 933 (codified as 
amended in I.R.C. § 122l(a)(3) (2006)). 
211. I.R.C. § 122l(a)(l) (excluding from the definition of capital asset inventory or property 
held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his or her trade or 
business). 
212. See S. REP. No. 81-2375 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053 , 3097. The 
capital asset exclusion for self-created property does not apply to non-individual creators, such as 
corporations whose employees or independent contractors created the copyrights. See Rev. Rul. 
55-706, 1955-2 C.B. 300, superseded by Rev. Rul. 62-141, 1962-2 C.B. 181 (applying inventory 
exclusion, but not copyright exclusion, suggesting that the copyright exclusion does not apply to 
works-for-hire creations); see also Desilu Plods., Inc. v. Comm 'r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1695 (1965) 
(same). 
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the same, was later viewed by some~particularly members of the country­
music industry~as quite harsh to songwriters. Because the average annual 
income of songwriters was quite low and often came in spurts, some thought 
the taxing of gains realized from song sales should differ from the taxing of 
compensation earned by wage earners. 213 In response, in 20 06, Congress 
amended the 1950 law, creating an exception for sales of musical compositions 
and copyrights in musical works 214 Under section 1221(b)(3), songwriters 
can elect to pay tax at capital gain rates rather than ordinary income rates on 
the sales of their copyrighted songs. 215 Although this exception was pushed to 
remove perceived tax inequity facing songwriters, it could more accurately be 
viewed as a response to assiduous lobbying efforts by the music industry. 
2. Tax Rules for Trademark and Trade Name Expenditures 
To eliminate inequities facing small businesses that owned trademarks and 
. . 5 216 "'" trade names, Congress enacte d sectwn 177 m 19 6. Be1ore the enactment 
of section 177, expenditures paid in connection with trademarks and trade 
names, such as legal fees, were not currently deductible21 7 and were not 
recoverable under early tax depreciation rules because trademarks and trade 
names have indeterminable useful lives. 218 Certain large corporations, which 
had in-house legal staff handling trademark and trade name matters, were 
avoiding this result by deducting compensation with respect to these matters 
because of difficulties of identification. Smaller companies, which could not 
afford to maintain their own legal staff, had to pay outside counsel or 
consultants to perform functions related to trademarks and trade names and 
were required to capitalize such expenses. Section 1 77 was enacted as an 
attempt to eliminate the existing hardship and inequities facing small 
corporations. 219 It allowed a taxpayer to elect to depreciate over sixty months 
certain costs incurred in connection with the acquisition, protection , expansion, 
213. See Brady Mullins, Music to Songwriters' Ears: Lower Taxes: Country Artists' Group 
Presses Lawmakers to Slash the Levy on Lyricists, WALL ST. 1., Nov. 29, 2005, at A4 (quoting 
Bart Herbison, executive director of 1he Nashville Songwriters Association International). For 
criticism of this argument and government response, see James Edward Maule, I Sing a Song of 
Taxes, a Pockeifill of Cries, MAULEDAGAIN BLOG (Nov. 30, 2005, 10:39 AM), 
http://mauledagain.blogsport.com/2005 _11_ 0 1_ archive html. 
214. See Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 
204(a)(3), 120 Stat. 345 (2006), amendedbyTax Relief and Heal1h Care Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-432, § 412, 120 Stat. 2922; see also H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 94 (2006) (Conf Rep.), 
reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 234, 292. 
215. Specifically, I.R.C. § 122l(b)(3) (2006) provides 1hat, at 1he election of a taxpayer, the 
section 122l(a)(l) and (a)(3) exclusions from capital asset status do "not apply to musical 
compositions or copyrights in musical works sold or exchanged by a taxpayer described in 
[section 122l(a)(3)]". 
216. Act ofJune 29, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-629, § 4(a), 70 Stat. 406 (1956). 
21 7. For treatment of litigation costs incurred in trademark and trade name infringement 
cases, see supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. For treatment oflitigation costs incurred 
in defending cancellation of a trademark, see Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283, 287 
(41h Cir. 1973) (holding that attorney's fees incurred in defending cancellation of a trademark 
were nondeductible capital expenditures). 
218. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
219. S. REP. No. 84-1941, at3-4 (1956). 
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registration, or defense of a trademark. 220 
Section 177 was repealed in 1986. 221 The tax rule for trademark and trade 
name expenditures was viewed as inappropriate for a number of reasons: the 
possibility that large companies were finding a way to deduct otherwise capital 
expenditures did not justify an amortization election for all; a five-year 
amortization only partially alleviated any unfairness; and there was no basis for 
a presumption that investment in trademarks and trade names produced social 
benefits that market forces might adequately reflect. 222 
3. Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions ofIntellectual Property 
In its most dramatic effort to alleviate unfairness and close a tax loophole, 
Congress amended on two occasions the charitable deduction rules for 
intellectual property donations. 223 Since 1917, the government has provided a 
financial incentive for taxpayers to transfer property to charities by giving 
taxpayers an immediate tax deduction for their donations. 224 Historically, the 
amount of the taxpayer' s charitable contribution deduction was the fair market 
value of the property contributed. 225 By granting an immediate deduction 
equal to the fair market value of the donated property, the charitable deduction 
provided an important economic incentive for patentees, authors, and artists to 
donate their ~atents and creative works to further the work of charitable 
organizations. 26 The deduction served as an important incentive for writers, 
artists, and photographers to make in-kind donations to museums, libraries, 
universities, and other charitable organizations. 227 Similarly, it was a vital tool 
for the transfer of technology from research corporations to research 
universities and other nonprofit donees where the technologies could be 
1 . d 1 228exp mte proper y. 
220. I.R.C. § 177 (repealed 1986). 
221. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 24l(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2181 (1986). 
222. S. REP. No. 99-313, at 256 (1986). 
223. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 882, 118 Stat. 1418 
(2004). 
224. See Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1201(2)(a), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917) 
(allowing charitable tax deduction for contributions by individuals); see also Revenue Act of 
1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, § 102(r), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016 (1935) (allowing charitable tax deduction 
for contributions by corporations). For the modem day statutory provision, see I.R.C. § 170 
(2006). 
225. See Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C. B. 126 ("The fair market value of an undivided present 
interest in a patent, which is contributed by the owner of the patent to an organization described 
in section 170(c) ... constitutes an allowable deduction as a charitable contribution, to the extent 
provided in section 170, in the taxable year in which such property is contributed."); see also 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1 70A-l(c) (2010) ("If a charitable contribution is made in property other than 
money, the amount of the contribution is the fuir market value of the property at the time of the 
contribution reduced as provided in section 170(e)(l) ....'); H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 53 (1969), 
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1699 (providing that taxpayer who contributed appreciated 
property to charity was allowed a deduction for fair market value ofproperty). 
226. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(l) (2006). 
227. See id. § 170(c)(2)(b). 
228. Large corporations with research and development facilities often develop patents that 
later become inconsistent with their missions or core technologies, that are inappropriate for 
licensing to third parties, or that have no value (for defensive purposes) in competitive markets. 
See RoN LAYTON & PETER BLOCH, IP DoNATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW 5 (2004). 
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The government defined "fair market value" as "the price at which the 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, 
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable 
knowledge of relevant facts." 229 The government, however, never fully 
articulated or formalized a standard or ap2roach for determining the fair 
market value of donated intellectual property 230 As a consequence, valuation 
conflicts between donors and the government increasingly occurred as 
intellectual property wew in value and the practice of intellectual property 
donations also grew. 2 
In its first major attack on intellectual property donations, Congress took 
significant measures to curtail the availability of immediate tax benefits for 
contributions of copyrights by creators. 232 Section 170( e), added by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, reduced the amount of the charitable deduction from fair 
market value to the creator's basis in the copyright233 Because copyright 
creators typically have a zero basis, or very low basis, in their copyrighted 
works, the amendment effectively precluded artists, musicians, photographers , 
and other copyright creators from enjoying any tax benefit from their 
234
charitable donations. 
The 1969 amendment impacted only copyright creators. 235 It had no effect 
on copyright purchasers who later donated their intellectual property. 
Similarly, the amendment had no effect on other forms of intellectual:8roperty, 
such as patents, trademarks, trade names, and computer software. 6 This 
created questionable distinctions in the tax system. Art collectors and 
investors were entitled to deduct the fair market value of their tangible 
property donations, but artists were entitled to deduct only their basis in their 
donated self-created works. 237 Likewise, patent developers were entitled to 
deduct the fair market value of their donated patents, but copyright creators 
were entitled to deduct only the basis in their donated copyrights. 238 These 
distinctions remained in the Code for thirty-five years until Congress's second 
229. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1 70A-1(cX2) (2010). 
230. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(b) (2006). 
231. Sean Conley, Paint a New Picture: The Artist-Museum Partnership Act and the Opening 
ofNew Markets for Cmritable Giving, 20 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PRoP. L. 89, 93 
(2009). 
232. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487, 555 (1970). 
233. !d. 
234. An artist's basis in her copyrighted artwork, for instance, is the cost of the brushes, 
canvases, pencils, or paper to the extent not previously deducted. 
235. See STAFF OF THE JOlNT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., 
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 17 1-72 (Comm. Print 1970). 
236. !d. 
237. As one notable artist stated: "If anyone else buys my painting for $2, he can then give it 
to a museum and deduct $10,000 from his taxes, if that is the market value of the piece. If I 
myself donate it, I get $2 tax credit, because that is what the paint and the canvas cost." Burgess 
J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Artists, Tax Collectors, and Private Foundation Status, 103 TAX 
NoTEs 195, 195 n.1 (2004) (quoting artist Ettore DeGrazia, who gained notoriety after he burned 
over 100 ofhis oil paintings over frustration with tax treatment of successful artists). 
238. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(b)(iii) (2006). 
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major attack on intellectual property donations in 2004. 239 
As patents became increasingly valuable assets and patent donations 
flourished, the government became increasingly concerned over valuation 
abuses by patent donors, and courts were increasingly confronted with 
240
valuation disputes. In 2004, in a drastic and hasty move, Congress 
amended the charitable deduction provision by eliminating the fair market 
value standard for contributions of most forms of intellectual property,
241
reducing the initial amount a donor may deduct. As with the 1969 
legislation impacting self-created copyrights, the 2004 legislation limited the 
initial charitable deduction of any type of intellectual property to the property's
242tax basis. Often the donor's tax basis in intellectual property is very small; 
in many cases, the donor's basis is zero because development costs are often 
243deducted when incurred. To encourage charitable giving of intellectual 
property, Congress deemed it appropriate to grant donors of intellectual 
property future charitable deductions based on the income received by the 
244donee charity. Specifically, the donor can take a deduction for up to ten 
245 years for gifts of royalty-producing intellectual property to public charities. 
The amount of the charitable deduction is a percentage of the royalty income 
246 Th d 1" . 247earned b y t h e donee. e percentage ec mes over tlme. 
C. SIMPLIFYING RULES AND IMPROVING CLARITY OF TAX RESULT 
In many instances, special tax rules were enacted to reduce procedural 
dissonance that occurred upon the application of general tax rules to 
248intellectual property As explained earlier, numerous disputes between 
taxpayers and the government arose over the proper tax treatment of 
intellectual property development and acquisition costs as well as over the 
239. See American Jobs Creation Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 1, 118 Stat. 1418. 
240. In Notice 2004-7, the Service stated that "some taxpayers that transfer patents or other 
intellectual property to charitable organizations are claiming charitable contribution deductions in 
excess ofthe amounts to which they are entitled" and warned that ''the Service intends to disallow 
improper charitable contribution deductions claimed by taxpayers in connection with the transfer 
ofpatents or other intellectual property to charitable organizations." I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004­
1 C.B. 310. A number of courts had also been addressing valuation disputes. See, e.g, Smith v. 
Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1981), ajj'd, 691 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding that the 
value of a donated patent was $3,500, although patent donor claimed charitable deduction in 
excess of$200,000). 
241. American Jobs Creation Act, § 1. The 2004 legislation applies to most forms of 
intellectual property including patents, certain copyrights, trademarks, trade names, trade secrets 
and know-how, certain software, and similar intellectual property or applications or registrations 
ofsuch property. H.R. REP. No. 108-548, at 360, 362 (2004). 
242. See I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-1 C.B. 310. 
243. See I.R.C. § 174(a) (2006), discussed supra notes 195, 201 and accompanying text. 
244. I.R.C. § 170(m)(3). 
245. !d. § 170(m)(5). 
246. !d. § 170(m)(7). 
247. !d. § 170(mX1), (7). The deduction under section 170(m) is subject to the percentage 
limits in section 170(b)(l)(A) and is reduced by the amount of the deduction allowed in the year 
of the gift. !d. § 170(m)(2), (10)(A). 
248. SeeS. REP. No. 83-1622, at 112 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4747; S. 
REP. No. 91-552, at 198-99 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2243-44. 
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. 11 1 d. . . d Thproper tax treatment o f mte ectua property 1spos1t1on procee s. 249 ere 
also existed considerable diversity of opinion among the courts over how to 
apply Beneral tax principles to increasingly valuable intellectual property 
assets. 0 On several occasions, Congress enacted federal legislation to 
. 1 . f 1 2511mprove c anty o tax resu t. 
1. Tax Rules for Patent Development andAssignments 
In the earliest example, Congress enacted in 1954 sections 174 and 1235, 
which helped to eliminate uncertainties over the proper tax treatment of patent 
development costs and patent assignments. 252 Section 174 allows taxpayers to 
elect to immediately deduct qualified research expenditures that would 
otherwise be capitalized. 253 While the primary justification for the special 
deduction was to encourage new research and development activity and 
stimulate economic growth and technological development, 254 another 
justification was to reduce uncertainties caused by a~plying the asset 
capitalization rules to research and development activities. 25 
Section 1235 provides some bright-line rules for determining when a patent 
transfer will qualif~ for reduced capital gain rates as opposed to ordinary 
income tax rates. 2 6 While it was intended to encourage research and 
development that potentially leads to patentable inventions, it was also an 
attempt to reduce uncertainty and minimize disputes over the application of 
general tax principles to patent transfers257 When applicable, section 1235 
provides statutory assurance that a patent transfer will not be deemed a license 
merely because of the existence of contingent payments. 258 It eliminates 
uncertainty over whether a patent transferor is an amateur, who is eligible for 
249. Gregory M. Beil, Internal Revenue Code Section 197: A Cure for the Controversy Over 
the Amortization ofAcquired Intangible Assets, 49 U. MlAMI L. REv. 731, 734 (1995). 
250. S. REP. No. 91-552, at 198. 
251. See I.R.C. §§ 174(a), 1235(a). 
252. Id. 
253. See supra notes 195, 201 and accompanying text. 
254. See supra note 195. 
255. See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text. See DavidS. Hudson, The Tax Concept 
of Research or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAW. 85, 88-89 (1991) (explaining that another 
justification for section 174 is that the capitalization rule is difficult to applying to research and 
development costs); George Mundstock, Taxation ofBusiness Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. 
REv. 11 79, 1258-59 (1987) (stating a reason for enacting section 174 was to reduce uncertainty 
caused by applying the asset-capitalization rules to research and development). 
256. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text 
257. SeeS. REP. No. 83-1622, at 422 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082. A 
stated policy goal underlying § 1235's enactment is "to provide an incentive to inventors to 
contribute to the welfare of the Nation." Id. 
258. See I.R.C. § 1235(a) (2006) (providing that section 1235 applies regardless of whether 
the payments received are payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the 
transferee's use of the patent or are contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the 
property transferred); see also S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 422 (1954), reprinted in 1954 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082 (stating that section 1235 was intended ''to give statutory assurance to 
certain patent holders that the sale of a patent (whether as an 'assignment' or 'exclusive license') 
shall not be deemed not to constitute a 'sale or exchange' for tax purposes solely on account of 
the mode ofpayment."). 
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capital gain treatment under general tax principles, or a professional inventor
259
who is not eligible for capital gain treatment under general tax principles. 
And, it eliminates the need to ascertain the holding period of an invention for 
purposes of meeting the requisite one-year holding period under the general 
capital gain provisions. 260 If the safe harbor provision is satisfied (there exists 
a transfer of "all substantial rights" by a "holder" to an unrelated party, as 
those terms are defined), then a patent transferor is assured capital gain 
treatment. 261 Determinations of what constitutes a sale under general sale or 
exchange principles and determinations of what constitutes a capital asset are 
therefore unnecessary. 
2. Tax Rules for Trademark and Trade N arne Dispositions 
Another area of the law in desperate need of clarification concerned the 
proper tax consequences of trademark and trade name dispositions. As 
discussed earlier, there was considerable diversity of opinion among courts 
over what sorts of interests retained by transferors should preclude capital gain 
treatment, and there was uncertainty over the impact of contingent payments in 
trademark and trade name transfers 262 Congress added section 1253 in 1969 
to bring clarity to this area of the law. 263 
First, section 1253 mandates ordinary income treatment for all payments 
that are contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of a trademark or 
trade name. 264 Contingent amounts received or accrued for the transfer of a 
trademark or trade name constitute ordinaq income regardless of whether the 
transfer is in substance a sale or a license. 65 Second, section 1253 imposes 
ordinary income treatment on noncontingent payments (whether up-front or 
installment payments) received for the transfer of a trademark or trade name if 
the transferor retains any significant power, right, or continuing interest with 
259. See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at A280 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U .S.C.C.A.N. 401 7, 
4422; S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 112 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4747 (stating 
that section 1235 can provide capital gaills treatment to all inventors, whether amateur or 
professional, regardless how often they sell their patents). 
260. See I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2006). The tax treatment of a capital gam depends generally on 
the property's holding period. See id. Under general characterization rules, only long-term 
capital gains are accorded preferential tax treatment. See id A long-term capital gain requires a 
holding period of more than one year. See id Under the special characterization provision of 
section 1235, however, the actual holding period becomes irrelevant See id 
261. Id. § 1235(a)-(b), (d). 
262. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text 
263. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 516(c)(l), 83 Stat. 487, 64 7 (1969); see 
also S. REP. No. 91 -552, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2243; H. REP. No. 91-413, 
reprinted in 1969U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1815-16. 
264. I.R.C. § 1253(c) (2006). 
265. A question left open by Congress is whether all payments received in a sale should be 
treated as ordinary income with no basis recovery or whether the transferor should be permitted to 
recover his or her basis. In other words, does section 1253 transform a transaction, which in form 
and substance is a sale, into a license? See James 0. Tomerlin Trust v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 876, 892 
(1986) (holding characterization ofpayments under section 1253 was inconclusive in determining 
whether payments were royalties for purposes of the personal holding company tax because 
section 1253 does not determine whether a sale has occurred). 
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respect to the subject matter of the mark or name. 266 The Code sets forth six 
potentially significant powers, any one of which, if retained, would require 
ordinary income treatment. 267 This list of retained powers is not exhaustive; 
rather, consideration is given to all the facts and circumstances existing at the 
time of a transfer to determine whether an unenumerated power constitutes a 
significant power. For example, the duration of the relevant restriction is 
important in determining whether the restriction is significant. 268 
While clarifying the tax consequences to transferors of trademarks and trade 
names, Congress also, in 1969, provided a new set of tax rules for transferees 
of such property. 269 Section 1253 clarified that a transferee could deduct as a 
business expense contingent payments, i.e. , payments contingent on the 
productivity, use, or disposition of the trademark or trade name transferred. 270 
In the case of a lump sum pay ment, section 1253 provided that the transferee 
could amortize the payment over the lesser of the term of the trademark 
agreement if the agreement had a limited term or ten years 271 In 1989, 
Congress amended section 1253. First, it provided that a transferee's 
contingent payments were deductible only if the contingent amounts were paid 
as part of a series of payments that were payable at least annually throughout 
the term of the transfer agreement, and the ~atments were substantially equal 
in amount or payable under a fixed formula. 7 Second, it limited the ten-year 
amortization rule for lump sum amounts to transactions in which the lump sum 
amount paid for a trademark or trade name did not exceed $1 00,000; it also 
provided a new twenty-five year amortization period for fixed sum amounts 
266. I.R.C. § 1253(a) (2006). 
26 7. Significant retained powers, rights, and interests include: 1he right to disapprove an 
assigrunent, 1he power to terminate 1he transfer at will; 1he right to prescribe standards of quality 
for 1he transferee using 1he trademark; 1he right to require 1he transferee to enter an exclusive 
sales agreement with 1he transferor; 1he right to require that the transferee purchase substantially 
all supplies and equipment from the transferor; and 1he right to payments contingent upon 1he 
productivity, use, or disposition of 1he trademark or trade name were such payments are a 
substantial element of1he transfer agreement. !d. § 1253(b)(2)(A)-(F); see Consol. Foods Corp. 
v. United States, 569 F.2d 436, 438 n.l (71h Cir. 1978); see also Stokely USA, Inc. v. Comm'r, 
100 T.C. 439, 457 (1993); Jefferson-Pilot Corp. v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 435, 447-48 (1992), ajj'd, 
995 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1993); Tele-Commc'ns, Inc. v . Comm'r, 95 T.C. 495, 515-16 (1990), 
ajf'd, 12 F.3d 1005 (101h Cir. 1993). 
268. See Stokely USA Inc., 100 T.C. at 455-5 7 (finding a five-year right to disapprove a 
transfer insignificant, but finding significant a twenty-year restriction preventing the transferee 
from using 1he trademark on certain products). 
269. I.R.C. § 1253(c)-{d) (1970). 
270. !d. § 1253(d)(l) ("Amounts paid or incurred during the taxable year on account of a 
transfer, sale, or oilier disposition of a franchise, trademark, or trade name which are contingent 
on the productivity, use, or disposition of1he franchise, trademark, or trade name transferred shall 
be allowed as a deduction under section 162(a)."). Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 
§ 516(c)(l), 83 Stat. 48 7, 647 (1969). 
271. I.R.C. § 1253(d)(2) (1969). Section 1253(d)(2) provided for amortization of1he cost ofa 
trademark or trade name if, pursuant to section 1253(a), 1he transfer of 1he trademark was not 
treated as a sale or exchange of a capital asset. !d. Section 1253(a) stated that a transfer was not 
treated as a sale or exchange of a capital asset if 1he transferor retained any significant power, 
right, or continuing interest wi1h respect to 1he su~ect matter of1he trademark or trade name. !d. 
§ 1253(a) (1969). 
272. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7662(a), 103 Stat. 
2106,2377. 
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exceedmg. $100,000. 27 3 In 1993, the ten-year and f.twenty- rve-year 
amortization rules in section 1253 were eliminated with the enactment of 
section 197, which provided a fifteen-year amortization rule for capitalized 
trademark and trade name acquisition costs. 274 As discussed below, the 
purpose of section 197 and the corresponding changes to section 1253 was to 
simplify the law and minimize disputes regarding the depreciation of 
. "bl 27 5 mtangr es. 
3. Tax Rules for Depreciating Intellectual Property Acquisition Costs 
Without doubt, Congress's greatest effort at rule simplification occurred in 
1993 when Congress attempted to simplify tax depreciation rules for intangible 
property. Under historic tax depreciation rules, the capitalized costs of 
acquiring intellectual property could be recovered only if the intellectual 
property had a limited useful life that could be determined with reasonable 
accuracy 2 76 As explained earlier, there were many problems with applying 
these traditional tax depreciation rules to intellectual property 277 To address 
these problems and simj§lify the tax treatment of intangibles, Congress enacted, 
in 1993, section 1972 Section 197 provides a single depreciation method 
(straight-line depreciation) and a single recovery period (fifteen years~ for the 
capitalized costs of acquiring many forms of intellectual property. 2 9 The 
fifteen-year recovery period was not based on any measure of actual usefulness 
of intangibles in a business but was chosen because it was the shortest period 
. . 280 
that would not have a negahve revenue 1mpact. 
Section 197 provides a list of intangible property that is subject to ratable, 
273. !d. § 7662(b)--{c). 
274. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261(c), 107 Stat. 
312, 539 (Paragraph (1) of section 1253(d) remained the same allowing a current deduction for 
contingent serial payments. Paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) of section 1253(d) were replaced 
with new paragraphs (2) and (3). New paragraph (2) provides that "[a)ny amount paid or incurred 
on account of a transfer, sale, or other disposition of a ... trademark, or trade name to which 
paragraph (1) does not apply shall be ... chargeable to capital account.'). 
275. H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 690 (Conf Rep.), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 
1379. 
276. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (2010), discussed supra notes 35-39 and accompanying 
text. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF 
THE TAX SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 1993, at 1 (Comm. Print 1993) (explaining that Congress 
created section 197 to eliminate considerable confusion over the federal tax treatment of 
amortizable intangible assets). 
277. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text. 
278. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 416 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. §197 (1993)). 
279. Specifically, section 197 provides a fifteen-year depreciation deduction for the 
capitalized costs ofan "amortizable section 197 intangible," and prohibits any other depreciation 
or amortization deduction with respect to that property. I.R.C. § 197(a)-(b) (2006). Section 197 
defines an "amortizable section 197 intangible" as any "section 197 intangible" acquired after 
August 10, 1993, and held in connection with a trade or business or an activity conducted for 
profit. !d. § 197(c)(l). Section 197 provides a list of intangible assets that fall within the 
definition of "section 197 intangible" and are subject to fifteen-year amortization. !d. § 197(d). 
Section 197 also specifically excludes certain intangible assets. !d. § 197(e). 
280. Beil, supra note 249, at 733-34. 
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fifteen-year depreciation. 281 Specifically mentioned is "any patent, copyright, 
formula, process, design, pattern, know-how, format, package design, 
computer software ... or interest in a film, sound recording, video tape, book_, 
282 
or other . "1 property, " as we11 as any tra demark or trade 28~s1m1 ar name. 
Section 197 intangible property also includes goodwill, going concern value, 
customer lists, covenants not to compete, and a few other intangibles. 284 
Although the definition of section 197 intangibles appears broad enough to 
encompass nearly all forms of intellectual property, there are several important 
exceptions. Section 197 does not apply to off-the-shelf software. 285 More 
importantly, though, section 197 does not apply to any interest in a patent, 
patent application, copyright, or com~uter software that is not acquired as part 
ofa purchase ofa trade or business. 86 Trade secrets, know -how, trademarks, 
and trade names are not included within the exception for separately acquired 
assets. 287 Thus, these forms of intellectual property are subject to fifteen-year 
amortization under section 197 regardless of whether they were acquired as 
part of a trade or business or separately. 288 
Interestingly, Congress has chosen different tax depreciation rules for 
intellectual property excluded from section 197' s scope-separately acquired 
patents, separately acquired copyrights, separately acquired software, and off­
the-shelf software. 289 
For patents and copyrights acquired outside the context of a business 
acquisition, tax depreciation rules applicable prior to 1993 generally continue 
to apply. 290 Thus, the capitalized costs of separately acquired patents and 
copyrights are recovered under one of two approaches: (1) over their useful 
lives under the straight-line method or (2) as income is earned under the 
income forecast method. 291 In 1997, Congress codified the income forecast 
method of depreciation in section 167(g) of the Code, providin~ a maximum 
recovery period of eleven years for income forecast property. 92 In 2004, 
281. I.R.C. § 197(d). 
282. Id. § 197(d)(l)(c)(iii); Treas. Reg.§ 1.197-2(b)(5) (2010). 
283. I.R.C. § 197(d)(l)(F); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(10) (2010). 
284. I.R.C. § 197(d)(l). 
285. Id. § 197(e)(3)(A). This exception applies to software (whether acquired as part of a 
trade or business or otherwise) that is readily available for purchase by the general public, is 
subjectto a non-exclusive license, and that has not been substantially modified. Id 
286. Id. § 197(e)(3)(A)(ii), (e)(4); Treas. Reg.§ 1.197-2(c)(7) (2010). 
287. Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(a)-14(a) (2010). 
288. I.R.C. § 197(a). 
289. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(a)-14(a)-(b) (2010); Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, 757 (2003). 
290. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-14(a) (providing that "intangibles excluded from section 197 are 
amortizable only if they qualifY as property subject to the allowance for depreciation under 
section 167(a)'). 
291. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. 
292. I.R.C. § 167(g); see also the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-188, § 1604, 110 Stat. 1755, 1836. Forecasted total income includes all income the taxpayer 
reasonably believes will be earned during the eleven-year period beginning with the year the 
property is placed in service. § 167(g)(l)(A), (g)(5)(C). In the eleventh year, a taxpayer may 
deduct any unrecovered costs left in the property. § 167(g)(l)(C). 
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Congress amended section 167(g), limiting the types of property for which the 
income forecast method may be used. 293 In 2005, Congress again amended 
section 167(g) to provide a special rule for applicable musical property. 294 
Although now expired, the provision permitted a taxpayer to elect to ratably 
deduct the costs of acquiring any musical composition or any copyright with 
respect to musical composition Rroperty over a five-year period instead of 
. h . " h d 295usmg t e mcome ~orecast met o . 
For off-the-shelf software and software acquired outside the context of a 
business acquisition, Congress created new cost recovery rules. Under section 
167(f), which was added to the Code in 1993 along with section 197, such 
software is to be depreciated over 36 months using the straight-line method. 296 
The justification for carving out a short three-year recovery period for readily 
available software and separately acquired software was that computer 
software differs significantly from other forms of intangibles in that its value is 
ascertainable and it has a measurable useful life. 297 A lengthy fifteen-year 
amortization period would bear no resemblance to the actual useful life of 
software298 and would exact a penalty on those U.S. companies extensively 
using computer software in their operations. 299 In 2003, Congress added off­
293. I.R.C. § 167(g)(6), amended by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108­
357, § 2, 118 Stat 1418. Eligible property is specifically limited to interests (including interests 
involving limited rights) in the following property: (1) motion picture films, video tapes, and 
sound recordings ; (2) copyrights; (3) books; ( 4) patents; (5) theatrical productions; and (6) other 
property as designated in published guidance by the Service. § 167(g)(6). The income forecast 
method is appropriate for these types of property because they possess unique income earning 
characteristics. For instance, the income potential of a purchased film varies as a direct result of 
the film's popularity; its economic usefulness cannot be measured adequately by the property' s 
physical condition or by the passage of time. See Guidance Cost Recovery Under the Income 
Forecast Method, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,025 (May 31, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) 
(explaining why the income forecast method is appropriate for properties specified in section 
167(g)). 
294. I.R.C. § 167(g)(8)(A), as added by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act 
of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 207, 120 Stat. 345, 350. 
295. An election may not be made for any tax year beginning after December 31, 2010. 
I.R.C. § 167(g)(8)(E). The special five-year option applied to capitalized expenditures paid or 
incurred by music publishers, performers, producers, and recording companies who acquired any 
applicable musical property (as well as to capitalized expenditures paid or incurred by 
songwriters and composers who created any applicable musical property). !d. § 167(g)(8)(A), 
(C). 
296. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261, 107 Stat. 
312, 538. See H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 680 (1993) (Conf Rep.), reprinted in 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1369. For purposes of section 167(f), computer software is defined as "any 
program designed to cause a computer to perform a desired fimction." I.R.C. §§ 167(f)(l)(B), 
197(e)(3XB). The term does not include "any data base or similar item unless the data base or 
item is in the public domain and is incidental to the operation of otherwise qualifYing computer 
software." Id 
297. Tax Treatment ofIntangible Assets: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong. 
148 (1992) (statement of the Coalition for Fair Treatment oflntangibles) [hereinafter Statement 
ofCoalition]. 
298. !d. at 36 (statement of William P. Benac, Treasurer, Electronic Data Systems). For 
example, Microsoft's word processing program "Word," which was introduced in 1983, saw four 
new versions and three major upgrades in the ten years subsequent to release. !d. at 51. 
299. The fifteen-year amortization period under section 197 would impede the ability of the 
United States information technologies to compete in world markets because it would effectively 
raise the cost of acquiring computer software by ten to fifteen percent. Id at 36. Many of the 
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the-shelf computer software to the list of tangible property eligible to be 
expensed immediately under section 179. 300 As a result, the cost of 
purchasing off-the-shelf software can be immediately deducted rather than 
. 1" d d . d hcap1ta 1ze an amortlze overt ree years. 301 
With these enactments, Congress dramatically changed the depreciation 
rules for acquired intellectual property. Congress provided an arbitrary fifteen­
year recovery period for intellectual property acquired in the context of a 
business acquisition, regardless of the intellectual property's legal life. 302 And 
it carved out a special three-year rule for certain computer software-off-the­
shelf software and separately acquired software. 303 Although Congress left 
the law as it was for several other forms of intangible assets, permitting them 
to be recovered over their useful lives under the straight-line method or over a 
maximum of eleven years under the income forecast method (e.g., separately 
acquired patents and separately acquired copyrights), these legislative 
enactments reflect a bold attempt to provide a uniform predictable set of tax 
rules for depreciating costs of intellectual property 304 
V. 	TilE CURRENT TAX CODE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A 
HARMONIOUS EXISTENCE? 
The United States has witnessed profound technological changes from the 
Industrial Revolution period to the Digital Age. The Industrial Revolution 
arrived in the United States and ~ave birth to subsequent eras wherein 
05 	 306
electricity switched nights to days, machines re~laced manual labor, 
telephones replaced face-to-face communications, 3 7 and rails connected 
competing computer software nations already had tax policies in place allowing for computer 
software to be amortized over either a three or five year period. Id at 36-37. Ultimately, a 
fifteen year amortization period would discourage software investment and impair international 
competitiveness. Statement ofCoalition, supra note 297, at 148. 
300. Since 1981, the government has permitted business taxpayers to elect to deduct 
immediately the cost of purchasing section 179 property. Section 179 property is generally 
tangible, depreciable, personal property-as opposed to real property-that is acquired for use in 
the active conduct ofa trade or business. I.R.C. § 179(d)(l). Off-the-shelf software was added to 
the list ofqualifYing property by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003. 
Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, 757 (2003). 
301. Only off-the-shelf software purchased in a tax year beginning after 2002 and before 2012 
qualifies for the special deduction under section 179. I.R.C. § 179(d)(l)(A). 
302. Beil, supra note 249, at 733-34. 
303. I.R.C. § 167(a)(l)(A), (g)(1)(c), (g)(5)(c). 
304. See id § 167 (g)( 1 )(A). 
305. Thomas Edison invented the phonograph and incandescent light bulb in 1877 and 1879, 
respectively. See The Inventions of Thomas Edison, ABouT.COM, 
http://inventors.about.com/library/inventorslb/edison htm Oast visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
306. Elias Howe inv ented and patented the sewing machine in 1846, and Isaac Singer 
improved and marketed Howe's sewing machine in 1851. See Elias Howe was the inventor ofthe 
first American-patented sewing machine, ABOUT.COM, 
http:/ /inventors.about.com/od/hstartinventors/a/Elias _Howe htm Oast visited Nov. 6, 201 0). 
307. Alexander Gral!am Bell invented the telephone in 1876. See Alexander Grahcon Bell­
Biography, ABOUT.COM, http ://inventors.about.com/library/inv entorslbitelephone2.htm Oast 
visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
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people, shortened distances, and shrank durations. 308 The rapid changes 
continued in the Digital/ Information Age when most analog machines and 
mechanical devices were replaced by better, faster, and more capable digital 
devices. 309 Data and information in every field are now collected, stored, 
dissected, analyzed, combined, and accessed digitally 310 Telecommunication 
is wireless, replacinft the slow and costly landline telephones and connecting 
people worldwide. 3 The Internet and its profound impact alter the ways 
humans communicate, function, connect, work, educate, and entertain 
together. 312 
The biotech industry has blossomed and flourished rapidly in the last couple 
of decades. 313 Genetic engineering feeds billions with revolutionary 
approaches to farming and affects global populations' quality of life314 Gene 
308. For an accmmt of the rapid changes in the United States during the Industrial Age, see 
generally JULIE HUSBAND & JIM O' LOUGHLIN, DAILY LIFE IN TilE INDUSTRIAL UNITED STATES, 
1870--1900, at back cover (Greenwood Press 2004) ("Daily life in the Industrial age was ever­
changing, unsettling, outright dangerous, and often thrilling. Electric power turned night into 
day, cities swelled with immigrants from the countryside and from Europe, and great fuctories 
belched smoke and beat unnatural rhythms while turning out consumer goods at an astonishing 
pace. Distance and time condensed as rail travel and telegraph lines tied the vast United States 
together as never before."). 
309. See Mathew Goodman, Digital Age Ushers in Epic Cinema Changes, SUNDAY TIMES, 
July 30, 2006, at 11, available at 
http:/ !business. timesonline. co.ukltol!business/industry_sectors/medial article 1 0841 05 .ece. 
Goodman noted that: 
Traditional analogue equipment is able only to project reels of film on 
to the big screen. But digital projectors open up a range ofnew possibilities. 
For instance, they allow exhibitors to provide video games or broadcast live 
events, such as football matches or pop concerts. They could even be used 
by companies for sales demonstrations or lectures. 
They also allow cinemas to become more flexible with the films they 
show. A piece ofcelluloid for an analogue projector is heavy, unwieldy and 
expensive to produce. Digital films are much easier, like changing a 
cartridge on a video-games [sic] console, and a fraction of the cost to 
produce. For a chain such as Cineworld, which prides itself on screening 
films tailored to its local customer base, such as showing Bollywood movies 
in areas with large Indian populations, it will make life much easier. 
310. See generally Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Collateralizing Privacy, 78 TuL. L. REv. 553 
(2004) (discussing how data is collected, used, and abused). 
311. See, e.g, Michael L. Best, The Wireless Revolution and Universal Access, in TRENDS IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM 2003, at 107 (John Alden ed., 2003), available at 
http:/ /cyber.law harvard. eduldigitaldem ocracy!best -wirelessrevolution-sept03. 
312. See generally Nguyen & Maine, supra note 39; Nicholas Carr, Is Google Making Us 
Stupid?, THE ATLANTIC, July-Aug. 2008, at 56, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/ 200807/google (discussing the impact of Google search and the 
Net as the universal medium for instant information); Jeff Goldsmith, How Will The Internet 
Change Our Health System?, HEALTII AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 148, available at 
http:/lhealthaffhighwire.org/cgi/reprint/19/ 11148. Conferences on online teaching with focuses 
on challenges and opportunities are frequent where administrators and educators convene to share 
their expertise. See ONLINE TEACHING CONFERENCE 2010, 
http:/ /onlineteachingconference.org/presentations html (last visited Oct. 18, 201 0). 
313. See PeterS. Goodman, In NC., A Second Industrial Revolution, WASH. PoST, Sept. 3, 
2007, at A01, (reporting on how the biotechnology and technology industries have transformed 
North Carolina and the United States). 
314. See, e.g, BRYAN BERGERON & PAUL CHAN, BIOTECH INDUSTRY: A GLOBAL, 
EcONOMIC, AND FINANCING OVERVIEW 22 (2004) (asserting that the biotech industry has 
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research has led to new understanding of diseases and cures. 315 
. h 1 . 1' h nk . 316Bwtec no og1es are unrave mg t e u nown m cancers. New drugs are 
31 7invented to alter the cause of death. 
In the last forty years, intellectual property assets have risen meteorically, 
ascending in scale in corporate value and importance. In the decades before 
the Digital Age, companies such as Boeing, AT&T, GE, IBM, Texas 
Instruments, Microsoft, and Apple rose to domination with their products and 
services that were covered by patents, copyrights trade secrets, and trademarks 318
that changed the way of business and daily life. Many of these companies 
and their founders became household names, replacing Alexander Graham 
Bell, Thomas Edison, and John Singer. 319 
The Digital Age arrived and forced companies to change, adapt, or perish. 
Those that adapted and continued to innovate had a chance to survive. Others 
faded. One thing is certain: intellectual property continues to serve as an 
important asset to corporate competition and growth. For example, Texas 
Instruments and IBM changed their core businesses, moved away from 
manufacturing products, and embraced a licensing model that allowed them to 
capitalize on their strengths based on powerful patent portfolios. 320 Apple 
impacted the "quality oflife on a global scale"). 
315. Research Breakthrough Targets Genetic Diseases, MEDICAL NEws TODAY (Jan. 20, 
2009), http://www medicalnewstoday.com/articles/ 136010.php (reporting on genetic research 
breakthroughs). For latest information in gene research, biology and medicine news and 
technology, see About Us, Bra-MEDICINE, http ://www.bio-medicine.org/ (last visited Oct. 13, 
2010) (online web portals devoted to biology and medicine, posting the breaking news about the 
latest discoveries and research projects in the fields). 
316. See Gordon McVie, What Does the Biotech Revolution Mean?, THE GuARDlAN (Mar. 9, 
2003, 9:34AM), http ://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2003 /mar/09/health.lifeandhealth1 (focusing 
on how the biotech revolution would impact cancer research and treatment). 
31 7. For latest reports on new drug breakthroughs, see Pharmaceutical News and Articles, 
DRUGS.COM, http ://www.drugs.com/ news.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
318. The GE trademark alone was valued at $43 billion in 2001 , and the IBM trademark was 
valued at $52 billion. IBM leads all companies in seeking and obtaining the most patents issued 
by the United States Patent Office for its ever-expanding patent portfolio. See Brad Stone, 
Nickels, Dimes, Billions: Big Tech Companies are Raking in Big Bucks~A Little at a Time--By 
Charging for Use of Their Innovations, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 2, 2004), 
http:/ /newsweek. com /2004/08/0 1 /nickels-dimes-billions .html#. 
319. When Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft, stepped down there was an outpour of 
articles about the event. See, e.g., It's Official: The lvficrosoft 2.0 Era ms Begun, MICROSOFr 2.0 
(June 29, 2008 6:22 PM), http://www microsoft2 net/2008/06/29/its-official-the-microsoft-20­
era-has-begun/ (listing links to articles about Bill Gates leaving Microsoft after 33 years from The 
Economist, ABC News, National Public Radio, Investor's Business Daily, Gizmodo, Wired, and 
Reuters). With respect to Steve Jobs ofApple, the public and investors' obsession with his health 
are routinely reported in the media. See, e.g., Henry Blodget, Time For Apple to Finally Level 
with Investors About Steve Jobs' Health and Future Role, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 28, 2009, 
1 0:06 AM), http :1/ www. businessinsider. com/henry-blodget-time-for-apple-to-finally-level-with­
investors-about-steve-jobs-health-2009-6; Joe Nocera, Steve Jobs andApple: Here We Go Again, 
N.Y. TlMES (June 23, 2009; 12:56 PM), 
http:/ Iexecutivesuite. blogs nytim es .com/ 2009/06/23 /steve-j obs-and-apple-here-we-go-again/; 
Daniel Lyons, Why We Need Steve Jobs: Love Him or Hate Him, Apple Needs Its CEO Back 
Now., NEWSWEEK (June 23, 2009), http://www newsweek.com/2009/06/22/why-we-need-steve­
jobs html. 
320. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 
775, 787-90 (2008) (discussing the drastic change in business approach through aggressive patent 
licensing by TI and IBM); see also Stone, supra note 318. Stone notes: 
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changed its image of a desktop company to become an ultra-chic company 
with sleek products and accessones rangmg from computing to 
telecommunications to entertainment. 321 Anchoring Apple are the brand 
name, the trade secrets, the patents, the copyrights, and the software; they 
constitute the driving force for the creation, production, and distribution of 
Apple company products. 322 
In another example, Microsoft is no longer the global company with the 
omnipresence that it once had in the 1980s and early 1990s; Google has 
become the ubiquitous company globally323 What does it own? Google is 
powerful because of its search engine technology, which competes fiercely 
against and eliminates others in the web search industry. 324 Google's search 
IBM set the standard for patent licensing in the early '90s. While Big Blue 
was in a steep decline, veteran employee and lawyer Marshall Phelps got the 
company to raise the fees it charged others for piggybacking on its 
ubiquitous technology. Phelps recalls that incoming CEO Lou Gerstner was 
skeptical of the program; at RJR Nabisco, he had been involved in a patent 
dispute with Procter & Gamble over soft chocolate-chip cookies. Phelps 
changed Gerstner's mind by cracking open an IBM PC and showing him all 
the components that came from other companies. In other words: hardware 
companies were interdependent, and as the biggest fish in the sea, IBM 
should exploit that fact. A few years []later[,] IBM was raking in $2 billion 
a year of almost pure profit from licensing revenue. 
Id 
321. Apple' s products are often described as "cool" and "chic" by many. See John Delavan, 
Embrace Your Inner Ceek, LEGAL MGMT., July-Aug. 2007, at 4, 4 ("[M]y partner and I 
embarked on a long-planned mission to upgrade our home-computing situation, replacing an 
antiquated Apple iMac (one of those cool-looking but gigantic blue-shell machines with a handle) 
with a spiffY ne~ MacBook laptop."); John Delavan, Money Talks, LEGAL MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 
2007, at 4, 4 ( CEO Steve Jobs armounced the release of a bunch of cool new products, 
including iPod nanos that play video and the iPod touch, a nifty device that does everything the 
popular iPhone does except make phone calls."); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Browser 
Browsing, Ocr. CHI. B. Ass'N REc., Oct. 2008, at 58, 58 ("My immediate reaction to the 
interface on Apple' s Safari for Windows was, 'Cool, I am dabbling in Mac.' It feels a little like a 
[sic] being a college kid the first time you go into a jazz club."). 
322. As intellectual property assets are important to its corporate dominance, Apple is 
aggressive in protecting its intellectual property rights. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 
1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641, at *7-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005) (ordering an ISP to 
disclose identities oflntemet users accused ofmisappropriating Apple trade secrets),vacated, 44 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F. 3d 
1435, 1446--47 (9th Cir. 1994) (copyright infringement and other claims); Apple Inc. v. Psystar 
Corp., No. C 08-03251, 2009 WL 303046, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009) (software and copyright 
infringement claims); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Podfitness, Inc., No. 06-5805, 2007 WL 1378020, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2007) (trademark infringement and unfair competition claims); Victoria 
A. Cundiff, Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in a Digital Environment, 49 IDEA 
359, 404-05 (2009) (discussing how Apple sued to get the identity of the source for the trade 
secret disclosure). 
323. See Rob Hof, Is Coogle Too Poweiful?, Bus. WEEK (Apr. 9, 2007), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/conten1!07 _15/b4029001 htm?chan=gl (noting Google's 
global dominance in multiple industries and noting that Google's tactics and domination "might 
sound crazy given that we're talking about a nine-year-old company that wasn't even publicly 
traded until Aug. 19, 2004"). 
324. Id (Google' s search engine is "the No. 1 gateway to the Net' s vast commercial potential. 
With more data on what people are searching for, Google can serve up the most targeted and 
relevant advertisements alongside the results, drawing more clicks, more cash, more users-you 
get the idea."); see Miguel Helft, Coogle Jvfakes a Case That It Isn't So Big, N.Y. TlMES, June 28, 
2009, at Bl. ("Google handles roughly two-thirds ofall Internet searches" and "owns the largest 
153 
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engine technolo:fl¥ is proprietary and protected by trade secrets, software law, 
and patent law. Google has a vast database of information that is vital to its 
326 d " 32 7 . G 1 ' . . b ·1d· . . . " 1busmess. oog e s vast content 1s not m a m mg; 1t 1s m a c ou . 
The name "Google" is not just the dictionary name "google" but a global brand 
with a value estimated at approximately $25.59 billion, climbing from the rank 
of 20th to 1Oth global brand between 2007 and 2008. 328 
With these dynamic and profound technolofical changes, intellectual 
property has become a core corporate asset. 29 Reflective of these 
online video site, YouTube." Last year Google "sold nearly $22 billion in advertising, more than 
any media company in the world."). 
325. See Tenns of Service, GooGLE, http ://www.google.com/cse/ docs/cse/tos htrnl (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2010) (detailing Google's intellectual property and other rights and prohibiting 
users from violating Google's proprietary rights); Google's Opposition to the Government' s 
Motion to Compel at 1, Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 5:06-mc­
80006-JW), at 2006 WL 543697 (detailing Google's search engine technology and proprietary 
data protected under trade secret law). 
326. Google's Opposition to the Government's Motion to Compel, supra note 325; see also 
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Microsoft Lawyer to Blast Google, RED HERRING (Mar. 5, 2007, 10:00 
PM), http://www redherring.com/ Home/ 21533 (reporting on Google's Book Search content and 
the allegations asserted by publishers against Google in copyright infringement suit); Janet 
Morrissey, Librarians Fighting Google 's Book Deal, TlME (June 17, 2009), 
www.timecom/tim/printou1!0,8816,1904495,00.htrnl (reporting the Google Book content deal and 
the potential problems associated from the deal due to the vast size of the book content and 
Google's control). 
32 7. Elizabeth Montalbano, Microsoft Criticizes Drafting of Secret "Cloud Manifesto 
CIO.coM (Mar. 26, 2009), http ://www.cio.com/article/print486930/ (noting that Google is a big 
cloud proponent "with its Web-hosted products like the Apps collaboration suite and the App 
Engine development platform" while "Microsoft so far has neither been a thought nor a 
technology leader in cloud computing"); see also Stephen Baker, Google and the Wisdom of 
Clouds, Bus. WEEK (Dec. 13, 2007, 5:00 PM), 
http ://www. busines sweek. com/magazine/conten1!07_5 2/b4064048925 83 6 htrn. Baker notes: 
What is Google's cloud? It's a network made of hundreds of thousands, or 
by some estimates 1 million, cheap servers, each not much more powerful 
than the PCs we have in our homes. It stores staggering amounts of data, 
including numerous copies of the World Wide Web. This makes search 
faster, helping ferret out answers to billions of queries in a fraction of a 
second. U nlike many traditional supercomputers, Google's system never 
ages. When its individual pieces die, usually after about three years, 
engineers pluck them out and replace them with new, faster boxes. This 
means the cloud regenerates as it grows, almost like a living thing. A move 
towards clouds signals a fimdamental shift in how we handle information. 
At the most basic level, it's the computing equivalent of the evolution in 
electricity a century ago when farms and businesses shut down their own 
generators and bought power instead from efficient industrial utilities. 
Baker, supra. 
328. See Best Global Brands 2008, Bus. WEEK, 
http ://www.businessweek.com /interactive _reports/ global_ brand_ 2008 htrnl (last visited Feb. 17, 
2011) [hereinafter Global Brands] (reporting on Google as a global brand name). 
329. In the biotech industry, for example, the patentable subject matter of a man-made 
organism marked the beginning and growth of intellectual property assets and the biotech 
industry itself. See Intellectual Property, BroMELBOURNE NETWORK, 
http ://www.bio melbourne.org/ content_]lages /display/89 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) ("The 
biotechnology industry as we know it did not exist prior to the landmark Supreme Court decision 
of Diamond v. Chakrabarty of 1980. . . The patent system fosters the development of new 
biotechnology products and discoveries, new uses for old products and employment opportunities 
for [millions of Americans). Nowhere is this more apparent than in the biotechnology arena. 
Patents add value to laboratory discoveries, providing incentives for private sector investment 
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technological advancements and the rise of intellectual property as valuable 
assets is the growth of intellectual property law in the United States. 330 
Empowered by Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, 331 Congress passed the 
original ~atent and copyright statutes in April 1790 in the first congressional 
session. 3 2 As a result of subsequent case law development and statutory 
amendments through the years, patent, copyright trademark, and trade secret 
333laws are now well-developed in the United States. 
While the body of intellectual property laws developed rapidly beginning at 
the inception of the nation, income tax laws governing intellectual property 
were slow to evolve. 334 Indeed, until the mid-twentieth century, the resolution 
of tax issues regarding intellectual property involved the use of existing, 
traditional principles of taxation equally applicable to tangible property. 
Specific tax rules governing intellectual property transactions developed 
into biotechnology development of new medicines and diagnostics for treatment and monitoring 
of intractable diseases, and agricultural and environmental products, to meet global needs."). 
Intellectual property as core corporate assets can be seen through a brief review ofbrand names 
across the globe today and the billions ofdollars each brand commands and the goods with which 
each brand is associated: Coca-Cola for beverages (valued at $70.45 billion); IBM for computer 
services (valued at $64. 73 billion); GE for a wide range of industries from household appliances 
and heavy equipment to financing (valued at $42.81 billion). See Global Brands, supra note 328. 
330. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Stanford Institute for 
Economic Policy Research Economic Summit (Feb. 27, 2004) (transcript available at 
http://www federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200402272/) ("[I]n recent decades, as 
the economic product of the United States has become so predominantly conceptual, [so] have 
issues related to the protection of intellectual property rights come to be seen as significant . 
.");Merrill Matthews, Jr. & Tom Giovanetti, Why Intellectual Property Is Important, IDEAS (Inst. 
for Policy Innovation, Lewisville, Tex), July 8, 2002, at 1, available at 
http:/ /www.ipi. org/IPI%5 CIPIPublications .nsf/PublicationLookupFullTextPDF /94061686270E14 
F286256C3800514943/$File/II-CaseForiP-2.pdf?OpenElement (stating tlmt fue United States has 
become the powerhouse of intellectual property as the economy has shifted from an industrial- to 
an information-based economy and a new creative class of workforce has replaced other groups 
ofworkers). 
331. The Constitution offue United States provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Aufuors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to fueir respective Writings and Discoveries; ..."U.S. CoNST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8. 
332. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793). 
333. The patent statutes went through major revisions in 1952. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (noting fue re-codification of patent statutes in 1952 and what Congress 
revised in that year); Gral!am v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6-17 (1966) 
(discussing the Patent Act of 1952, noting fue history of patent law in the early days when 
Thomas Jefferson was the Commissioner of the Patent Office, and fue evolution of patent law, 
particularly on issues such as non-obviousness). Copyright law witnessed two major revisions: 
the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act of 1976. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. 
L. No. b0-849, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-77; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 
§ 102, 90 Stat 2541, 2598 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2009)); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. 
Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 47-49 (D. Mass. 1990) (discussing changes and 
legislative history of copyright statutes). With respect to trademark law, a substantial revision 
occurred in 1946 wifu the passage of the Lanham Act on trademarks and unfair competition. See 
BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 1-3 (1994) 
(tracking fue development oftrademark law through history up to fue codification of the common 
law in the Lanham Act). The model trade secret law or fue Uniform Trade Secrets Act was 
promulgated in 1979. See DavidS. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets 
Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PRoP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 772 (2009) (providing a history of 
trade secret law). 
334. See Sz.qJra Part IV. 
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slowly and separately from the body of law governing intellectual property 
rights. 335 These tax rules were designed primarily to resolve the procedural 
dissonance that occurred when general princ~les of taxation were used to 
resolve early intellectual property tax disputes. 6 Much of that dissonance in 
the intersection of intellectual property and taxation has been detected and 
addressed. But the ad hoc development of special tax rules created primarily 
with tax goals in mind resulted in a tax system that does not ideally support the 
intellectual property system and modern trends, such as the current business 
practice of integration and bundling of different types of intellectual property. 
A. SUPPORTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY'S INNOVATION GOALS 
The policy goals of intellectual property law often emphasize two mam 
principles: innovation and efficiency. Patent and copyright laws, in general, 
motivate innovation and creative activities of inventors and authors and induce 
the "release to the public of the products of [their] creative genius." 337 
Innovation is the cornerstone anchoring the growth and advancement of the 
United States338 Trade secret protection embodies the policy goal of 
innovation in addition to achieving efficiency through reduction of business 
misconduct relating to trade secret misappropriation. 339 Trademark law 
centers on the facilitation of efficiency in the marketplace for both consumers 
335. See id. 
336. See id. 
337. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 41 7, 429 (1984) (Copyright 
monopoly privileges "are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private 
benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be 
achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity ofauthors and inventors by the provision 
of a special reward."); United States v . Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The 
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. 
It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of 
his creative genius."); see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of 
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 288--89 
(1970) (examining the "property" right in copyrights and how the reward of''property" is "often 
created for reasons ofefficiency'). 
338. See United States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 332 (1948) ("As interpreter ofthe 
Congressional Acts that have expressed the patent policy of this nation since its beginning, this 
Court is entrusted with the protection of that policy against intrusions upon it. The crucial 
importance ofthe development of inventions and discoveries is not limited to this nation. As the 
population of the world has increased, its geographical frontiers have shrunk. However, the 
frontiers of science have expanded until civilization now depends largely upon discoveries on 
those frontiers to meet the infinite needs of the future. The United States, thus fur, has taken a 
leading part in making those discoveries and in putting them to use."). 
339. The Supreme Court has long recognized that with respect to innovations not eligible for 
patent protection: "Trade secret law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not 
reach, and will prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation 
ofhis invention. Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use ofvaluable, if 
not quite patentable, invention." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974); 
see a/so RESTATEMENT (TH1RD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITlON § 39 cmt. a (1995) ("[T)he protection 
of trade secrets has been justified as a means to encourage investment in research by providing an 
opportunity to capture the returns from successful innovations.'); Katarzyna A. Czapracka, 
Antitmst and Trade Secrets: The US. and the EU Approach, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TEcH. L.J. 207, 212 (2008) ("Consequently, trade secret protection involves the same 
fundamental policy choices between favoring innovation and favoring competition as laws 
protecting other forms ofiP.'). 
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and producers of trademarked products or services. 340 
The current tax regime governing intellectual property does not ideally 
support desirable intellectual property incentives and efficiencies. Several 
current tax rules reflect a polic'{ decision to incentivize developments of 
patents and patent-like property. 34 But these tax benefits are circumscribed in 
ways that undermine their utility. For example, the section 174 deduction for 
research and development expenditures applies to those inventors who use or 
intend to use their research results in a trade or business. 342 The deduction 
arguably does not apply to an inventor who merely intends to license the 
results of her inventive activities for taxable income, although a few courts 
have found a trade or business of inventing and thus permitted current 
343deductions. 
This requirement fails to recognize that, in today's 
innovation marketplace, very few individual inventors, startup 
compames, and young research entities develop their 
innovations into end products or services for commercial 
exploitation in a trade or business, but rather intend to sell or 
license their innovations to larger companies looking to 
acquire innovations to supplement their own research or build 
. . . 11 1 .. 1.prom1smg mte ectua property portlo 10s. 344 
Like the section 174 deduction (enacted in 1954), the section 41 research 
credit (enacted in 1981) was designed to encourage additional research and 
development. 345 As structured, however, the credit fails to achieve optimal 
technology outcomes. First, the credit's reformulation over the years has 
limited the types of research for which the credit is available. 346 Second, the 
incremental nature of the credit means many businesses cannot make use of 
any of the credit, placing U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage as 
compared to international firms entitled to greater tax incentives in their 
countries for research spending. 347 Third, the temporary nature of the credit 
340. See Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle Des Etrangers a 
Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 381 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that "the very real interest that our trademark 
laws have in minimizing consumer confusion" is to ensure "that our economy may enjoy the 
greatest possible of efficiencies"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of 
Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267 (1988) ("fhe overall conclusion is that 
trademark law . . . can best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote 
economic efficiency'); see also Berner Int'l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982 (3rd Cir. 
1993) (commenting that "[t]rademark protection is desirable because of the efficiencies and 
incentives produced by symbolic affiliation ofproducer and quality product'). 
341. See I.R.C. § 41 (2006) (providing a credit for certain research and development 
expenditures); id. § 17 4 (providing a deduction for certain research and development 
expenditures); id. § 1235 (providing preferential capital gain treatment for certain patent 
transfers). For a discussion of these tax incentives, see supra notes 194-202 and accompanying 
text. 
342. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 2, at 28-29. 
343. See id. 
344. See id. at 29. 
345. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. 
346. Not all expenditures that qualifY for the research deduction under section 17 4 qualifY for 
the research credit under section 41 due to special regulatory requirements and exceptions. 
347. The credit applies only to qualified research expenditures in excess of a base amount that 
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makes it difficult for firms to plan research activities. 
The current tax incentives for patents and patent-like property do not apply 
to other forms ofvaluable intellectual property, such as copyrightable property 
and trademarks. 348 As a ¥eneral rule, copyright and trademark development 
costs must be capitalized. 49 Limited exceptions have been carved out but 
arguably do not go far enough to achieve optimal copyright and trademark 
goals. 350 
With respect to copyright activ ities, a special exception in the Code permits 
freelance writers, photographers, and authors to deduct "qualified creative 
expenses" that would otherwise have to be capitalized. 351 But the exception is 
overly restrictive. First, the exception is not so broad as to include all 
individuals engaged in any creative activity. Rather it is limited to only certain 
individuals-writers, photographers, and artists-as those terms are defined in 
the Code. 352 Tax benefits for patent inventors are not so restrictive; both 
individual and corporate inventors are eligible to deduct costs of developing or 
improving a product, which is broadly defined. 353 Second, the exception for 
freelance writers, photographers, and authors is limited only to individuals 
whose activities rise to the level of a trade or business within the meaning of 
the Code. 354 For example, an author may currently deduct the costs of writing 
a book but only if the author has already established himself in the trade or 
business of writing. This is not a requirement for patent inventors; they only 
need to show that they have the intent and capability to enter a business with 
the resulting technology. 355 Further, although an author may deduct the costs 
is a "fixed-base percentage" of the taxpayer's average annual gross receipts for the four preceding 
tax years. I.R.C. § 41(a), (c)(l). For established finns, the fixed-base percentage is generally 
based on a ratio of the taxpayer's qualified research expenses to its gross receipts for years 1984 
to 1988, capped at 16%. Id § 41(c)(3)(A). Calculating today's credit based on research spending 
relative to receipts in the years 1984-1988 does not reflect the realities oftoday's economic and 
technological world and could penalize a company that had high research spending levels during 
the 1984-1988 base period. 
348. See, e.g, id § 1235. 
349. Id §§ 263, 263A; Treas. Reg. § 1.263-4 (2006). 
350. See, e.g, I.R.C. § 263A(h). 
351. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. 
352. A "writer" is defined as an individual whose personal efforts create, or may be expected 
to create, a literary manuscript, musical composition, or dance score. I.R.C. § 263A(h)(3)(A). A 
"photographer" is defined as an individual whose personal efforts create, or are expected to 
create, a photograph, a photographic negative, or transparency. Id § 263A(h)(3)(B). An "artist" 
is an individual whose personal efforts create, or are expected to create, a picture, painting, 
sculpture, statue, etching, dmwing, cartoon, graphic design, or original print edition. Id § 
263A(h)(3)(C). 
353. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 74-2(a). 
354. I.R.C. § 263A(h)(2)(A). 
355. For research and development costs to be deductible under section 174, they must be 
incurred "in connection with" the taxpayer's trade or business. Id § 174. Prior to 1974, the 
Service and the courts took the position that in order to qualify for section 17 4 treatment, a 
taxpayer must have already engaged in a trade or business. Snow v. Comm 'r, 482 F.2d 1029, 
1031-32 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U .S. 500 (1974). However, the Supreme Court rejected this 
narrow approach and held that pre-operational research or experimental expenditures could 
qualify for the section 174 deduction. 416 U.S. 500. Although a taxpayer need not be currently 
conducting a business, the taxpayer must, however, dernonstrate a realistic prospect of entering 
into a trade or business that will exploit the technology under development. See, e.g, Kantor v. 
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of writing a book, the author cannot immediately deduct the attorney's fees or 
fees paid to any government agency to obtain copyright protections on the 
developed product. 356 Again, these rules for attorney's and government fees 
do not apply to patent inventors; the tax law is very clear that all costs incident 
to the development of a patent are deductible, including attorney's fees in the 
. f 1" . 357prosecutwn o a patent app 1cat10n. 
Tax rules with respect to trademarks are quite unfavorable as compared to 
tax rules governin? patents and arguably are in disharmony with trademark 
goals in general. 35 Although the advertising costs of building up the goodwill 
value in trademarks are currently deductible even though such costs provide 
benefits of a long-term nature, most other trademark costs are not and must be 
capitalized. 359 For example, the fees paid to a government agency to obtain 
trademark protections must be capitalized. 360 In addition, legal fees incurred 
in trademark infringement actions generally must be capitalized. 361 
B. SUPPORTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHANGES 
Special tax rules applicable to intellectual property reference and define 
specific types of intellectual property. 362 For example, section 1235 of the 
Code applies only to "patents" as defined in the Treasury Regulations under 
1235 363sectwn sect10n "demar s d". , . 1253 app1"1es to tra k" an trade names, " as 
defined for tax purposes, 364 and section 197 applies to an enumerated list of 
intangible intellectual property assets, each of which is defined for tax 
. h 1 . 36~purposes m t e Treasury Regu atlons. 
One problem with this asset-specific approach is that the resulting tax 
regime governing intellectual property is not equipped to deal with emerging 
intangible intellectual property rights. For example, specific tax rules do not 
exist for domain names, valuable assets that emer~ed with the arrival of global
66
electronic commerce transactions on the internet. Are domain names mere 
Comm ' r, 998 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993). In making this determination, the taxpayer must 
demonstrate both an oQjective intent to enter into the trade or business or the capability to do so. 
Id 
356. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text. 
357. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1 74-2(a)(l). 
358. Id § 1.197-2(a)(l), (b)(lO), (c)(7). 
359. Id § 1.197-2(a)(l), (b)(lO), (c)(7), (k). 
360. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
361. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. 
362. See, e.g, Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a) (as amended in 1980). 
363. Id 
364. These terms were broadly defined in regulations that were proposed in 1971 but 
eventually withdrawn due to a sunset provision. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1253-1, -3, 36 Fed. Reg. 
13, 148 (July 15, 197 1), withdrawn by 58 Fed. Reg. 25,587 (Apr. 27, 1993). The term 
"trademark" for purposes of section 1253 was defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or 
any combination thereof, adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identity his goods 
and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." Id § 1.1253-2(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 
13,151 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)). 
365. Treas. Reg.§ 1.197-2(b). 
366. See Genevieve Bergeron & Rea Hawi, Dot-Ca Domain Name Dispute Resolution: 
Where Do We Stand Five Years after Implementation of the CIRA Policy, 21 lNTELL. PRoP. J. 
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variations of traditional forms of intellectual property, to which the existing tax 
regime can be applied? It could be argued that domain names that function as 
"source identifiers should be treated under the current tax regime applicable to 
trademarks" but that generic domain names are not dealt with by the existing 
tax regime. 367 This is troublesome in light of the valuable nature of generic 
domain names. Generic domain names are easy to remember-a generic or 
descriptive URL of a website. 368 The names specifY or describe the products 
or services offered at the website. 369 For example, www.loans.com is a URL 
for the online lending and banking services; it was purchased by Bank of 
America for $3 million. 370 Such names are generally not protected under 
trademark laws because they are generic. 371 Providing these names protection 
would render everyone else speechless and perpetuate anti-competiv eness. 372 
Though there is no trademark protection for these ?eneric names, they are 
valuable as domain names or URLs for a website. 3 7 Indeed, in the early e­
commerce era, internet companies paid millions of dollars for these generic 
names. 
374 Amazingly, the intellectual property tax regime does not 
specifically address these valuable assets. 
Another problem with the intellectual property tax regime's asset-specific 
approach is that it is not equipped to tackle the increasing integration and 
199, 200 (2008) ("Domain names, which are a true creation of the modern world of Internet, 
made their appearance in the commercial sector in 1993.'). 
367. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 39, at 4. 
368. See, e.g., Xuar1-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in e-Commerce: Move Over 
Inherently Distinctive Trademarks-The e-Brand, i-Brand and Generic Domain Names 
Ascending to Power?, SO AM. U. L. REv. 937, 965-66 (2001). 
369. Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(commenting that domain names are often company names and names ofproducts and services). 
370. Daniel Joelson, Banks Square Off Over Internet Domain Names , BANK TEcH. NEWS 
(Nov. 22, 2000), available athttp://www.americanbanker.comibtn_issues/13_11 /-137906-1 html 
(reporting that "loans.com" attracts daily visitors even though it does not have an active website). 
371. See generally Nguyen & Maine, supra note 39, at 48-55 (discussing how trademark law 
does not protect generic domain names). See also H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire 
Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reiterating the basic trademark principle that 
generic terms do not receive trademark protections in ar1y circumstance). The addition of .com to 
a generic term does not make the term registrable as a trademark. See In re Hotels. com, L.P., No. 
76414272, 2006 WL 2850864, at *12 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (Hotels.com is generic ar1d therefore a 
composite word/design mark not registrable unless entire term is disclaimed) (not precedent). 
372. See generally Nguyen, supra note 368, at 965-66 (commenting on whether generic 
domain names should be entitled to protection under existing law). 
373. See Susan Barbieri Montgomery, The New Uniform Commercial Code: Security 
Interests in Intellectual Property, SM088 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL Enuc . 373 (2007) 
(asserting that "not all domain names are marks and some of the most valuable domain names 
incorporate generic or descriptive terms not eligible for trademark protection, such as 
<www.sex.com>'); see also Ale House Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 137, 140 
(4th Cir. 2000) (holding genericness as a dispositive question to trademark protectability); Yellow 
Cab Co. of Charlottesville v. Rocha, No. CN. A. 3:00CV00013, 2000 WL 1130621, at *8 (W.D. 
Va. July 5, 2000). 
374. Domain Name Prices Rise Again, INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Dec. 29, 2003, at A02 
(reporting that domain name prices are on the rise again as evident by the purchase of''men.com" 
for $1.3 million by a group of entertainment executives from Rick Schwartz); S.A. Mathieson, 
It's All in the Name: Can You Still Find a Good Domain Name for Your Business?, THE 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 30, the2003, at 19 (reporting the sale of the domain name "business. com" for 
$7 .5 million and "ifcom" for $1 million). 
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bundling of intellectual property in business practice. Today, many different 
types of intellectual property are often bundled, as many forms of intellectual 
property protection are available for a particular product or service. 375 For 
example, Coca-Cola is protected by both trade secret and trademark laws. 376 
Software is a classic example of the "bundling" of rights in today's 
economy. For instance, Microsoft Windows is a set of complex software 
programs and is covered by many copyrights. 3 77 Each time a new version of 
the software is created, there is a potential new copyright. 378 Additionall.y
3 9
certain functions for Windows software programs are covered by patents. 
Moreover, there is proprietafd' information and know-how in Windows 
protected by trade secret law. 38 The name "Windows" is a known trademark, 
identifies the products widely installed in most computers, and is used by 
millions. 381 The four curving, colorful panels of the Windows logo are also 
entitled to protection under trademark law. 382 
Likewise, in the biotech or biopharma industry, drug companies rely on 
patents383 and trade secrets for the protection of their research and 
development of certain drugs. 384 The drug companies advertise the drugs, and 
375. Additionally, companies often bundle different types of intellectual property assets when 
they license in or out for the daily business operation. See generally Nguyen, supra note 109, at 
1309-10 (observing the bundling of trademarks and other intellectual property assets in licensing 
practices); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Intellec tual Property, 88 VA. L. REv. 1455 (2002) (noting the integration and simultaneous use of 
patents and trademarks in business practice and calling for a new theory ofintellectual property to 
address the integration ofdifferent types of intellectual property). 
376. ROBERT GOLDSCHEIDER, LICENSING AND THE ART OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 
LAw, TACTics, FoRMs§ 6.2 (2002). 
377 . See Microsoft Corp. v. Liu, No . 1:06-CV-1352-JOF, 2007 WL 4125753, at *3 (N.D. Ga. 
Oct. 31, 2007) (listing the certificates of copyright registrations for some of Microsoft Window 
software programs, such as: "(1) TX 4-905-936 (Office 2000 Pro); (2) TX 4-905-950 (Access 
2000); (3) TX 4-905-949 (Excel 2000); (4) TX 4-906-019 (Outlook 2000); (5) TX 4-905-952 
(PowerPoint 2000); (6) TX 4-905-951 (Word 2000); (7) TX 4-905-937 (Publisher 2000); (8) TX 
4-309-301 (FrontPage 2000); and (9) TX 4-899-117 (PhotoDraw 2000)"). 
378. See generally Mark F. Radcliffe & Nels R. Nelsen, Code to Code: Per:focting Security 
Interests in Copyrights: The ConfUsion Contim~es, 8 AM. BANKR. lNsT. L. REv. 8 (1997) 
(analogizing a computer software program to a layer cake, each layer representing a "new version 
or revision of the software ... protected by a separate copyright"). 
379. See Benjamin J. Kormos, Giving Frankenstein a Saul: Imposing Patentee Obligations, 
21 INTELL. PRoP. J. 309, 341 (2009) (reporting that, "(a]s of 2007, Microsoft held more than 
6,000 software patents"). 
380. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Contracts: Tales 
from a Test ofthe Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 338 (2009) (observing that 
Microsoft and other software companies rely on trade secret protection afforded to software 
programs distributed in binary form). 
381. Microsoft brought action against others for using its well-known Windows trademark. 
See Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com Inc., No. C01-2115C, 2002 WL 31499324, at *1 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 15, 2002). 
382. See Microsoft Corp. v. Silver Star Micro, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1350-WSD, 2008 WL 
115006, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 2008) (listing fue various trademark registrations for Microsoft 
"flag" logos in a trademark infungement case). 
383. See generally Phannaceutical Patents: The Value ofPhannaceutical Patents & Strong 
Intellectual Property Protection, INNOVATION.ORG, 
http://www.innovation.org/docurnents/File/Pharrnaceutical_Patents.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 
2010). 
384. See generally Trade Secrets Litigation, ORRICK, 
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they rely on copyright, trade dress, and trademark protections for their various 
advertising campaigns. Also, to market and sell their drugs, the companies 
will use trademarks along with pamphlets and instruction. On a particular 
drug, patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and trademark rights are bundled, as 
the drug companies aggressively seek protection in all four intellectual 
. fi h . d 385property doctnnes or t e1r pro ucts. 
The bundling phenomenon raises the question: how should a particular 
transaction involving integrated intellectual property be treated for tax 
purposes under a tax regime that maintains distinct rules for different types of 
intellectual property? An appropriate analytical framework is needed 
for revising and crafting tax legislation governing intellectual 
property, one that considers not only intellectual property goals but 
also the integrated nature of intellectual property protections in 
business. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The modem federal tax code does not adequately support contemporary 
intellectual property policies and the realities of today's economy. It does not 
ideally support the innovation goals of the intellectual property system. And it 
does not adequately recognize the evolution of intellectual property, the 
emergence of new intellectual property forms, or modem intellectual property 
practices and trends, such as the integration and bundling of different types of 
intellectual property in business today. A study of the historical development 
of the intellectual property tax regime reveals causes for the current dissonance 
between the tax code and intellectual property. As this Article establishes, the 
vast majority of the specific tax rules governing intellectual property were 
designed to enhance tax efficiency by resolving procedural dissonance that 
occurred when traditional principles of taxation were used to resolve early tax 
disputes. But the absence of an appropriate legal framework for intellectual 
property tax legislation-one that considers optimal harmonization with the 
intellectual property scheme-has resulted in a tax code that is fundamentally 
flawed. Moving forward, an appropriate legal framework is needed for tax 
rules; one that recognizes that tax law, as well as intellectual property law, is 
central to innovation. 
http://www .orrick.com/practices/intellectual __property/tradesecrets.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 
2010). 
385. See, e.g, Medication Guide, NucYNTA (2009), 
http://www nucynta.com/sites/all/themes/nucyntalpdf7nucynta-medication-guide. pdf 
